THE  CAMPAIGNS 


Gen.  Robert  E,  Lee, 


AN  ADDKESS 


BY 


LT.  GEN.  JUBAL  A.  EARLY, 


BEFORE 


Washington  and  Lee  University, 


January  19th,  1872. 


BALTIMORE: 
PRINTED  BY  JOHN   MUKPHY  &  Co. 

PUBLISHERS,  BOOKSELLERS,  PRINTERS  AND  STATIONERS, 
182   BALTIMORE  STREET. 

1872. 


THE  CAMPAIGNS 


or 


Gen,  Eobert  E.  Lee. 


AN  ADDKESS 


BY 


LT.  GEN.  JUBAL  A.  EARLYJt  r 


\\ 

BEFORE 


Washington  and  Lee  Uniyersity, 


January  f9th,  1872. 


BALTIMORE: 
PRINTED  BY  JOHN  MURPHY  &  Co. 

PUBLISHERS,  BOOKSELLERS,  PRINTERS  AND  STATIONERS, 
182   BALTIMORE  STREET. 

1872. 


ADDRESS, 

DELIVERED  IN  THE  CHAPEL  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY. 

LADIES  AND  GENTLEMEN, 

MY  FRIENDS,  COMRADES  AND  COUNTRYMEN  : 

THOUGH  conscious  of  my  inability  to  discharge,  in  a  suitable 
manner,  the  duty  assigned  me  on  this  occasion,  yet,  when  asked  to 
unite  in  rendering  homage  to  the  memory  of  the  great  Confederate 
Captain,  I  did  not  feel  at  liberty  to  decline  the  call.  I  have  real 
ized,  however,  most  fully  and  sensibly,  the  difficulties  of  the  posi 
tion  I  occupy.  All  the  powers  and  charms  of  eloquence  and  poe 
try  combined,  have  been  called  into  requisition,  to  commemorate 
the  deeds  and  virtues  of  him  whose  birth-day  we  celebrate.  They 
are  not  at  my  command,  and  the  highest  eulogy  which  I  am  capa 
ble  of  pronouncing  upon  the  character  of  our  illustrious  Chief, 
must  consist  of  a  simple  delineation  of  his  achievements,  couched 
in  the  plain,  unadorned  language  of  a  soldier,  who  bore  an  hum 
ble  part  in  many  of  the  events  which  marked  the  career  to  which 
your  attention  will  be  called.  I  must,  therefore,  throw  myself 
upon  your  kind  indulgence,  and  bespeak  your  patience,  while  I 
attempt  to  give  a  sketch  of  those  grand  achievements  which  have 
placed  the  name  of  Robert  E.  Lee  among  the  foremost  of  the  re 
nowned  historic  names  of  the  world. 

I  do  not  propose,  my  friends,  to  speak  of  his  youth,  his  early 
manhood,  or  his  career  prior  to  our  late  struggle  for  liberty  and 
independence.  These  have  been,  and  will  continue  to  be,  far  bet 
ter  portrayed  by  others,  and  I  will  content  myself  with  the  remark 
that,  together,  they  constituted  a  worthy  prelude  to  the  exhibition, 
on  a  larger  theatre,  of  those  wonderful  talents  and  sublime  virtues, 
which  have  gained  for  him  the  admiration  and  esteem  of  the  good 
and  true  of  all  the  civilized  world. 

3 

M174147 


Most  men  seem  to  have  a  just  appreciation  of  the  domestic  vir 
tues,  the  moral  worth,  the  unselfish  patriotism  and  Christian  purity 
of  General  Lee's  character ;  but  it  has  occurred  to  me  that  very 
few,  comparatively,  have  formed  a  really  correct  estimate  of  his 
marvellous  ability  and  boldness  as  a  military  commander,  however 
exalted  is  the  merit  generally  awarded  him  in  that  respect.  I  will, 
therefore,  direct  my  remarks  chiefly  to  his  military  career  in  our 
late  war,  though  I  am  unable  to  do  full  justice  to  the  subject.  I 
can,  however,  contribute  my  mite;  and  it  may,  perhaps,  not  de 
tract  from  the  interest  of  what  I  have  to  say,  when  you  know  that 
I  was  a  witness  of  much  of  which  I  will  speak. 

I  must,  necessarily,  go  over  much  of  the  same  ground  that  has 
been  already  explored  by  others,  and  repeat  something  of  what  I 
have  already  said  in  an  address  before  the  "  Survivors'  Association 
of  South  Carolina,"  and  in  some  published  articles.  I  will,  also, 
have  to  give  you  some  details  and  statistics,  to  show  what  was 
really  accomplished  by  our  army  under  the  lead  and  through  the 
inspiration  of  its  great  Commander.  Flowers  and  figures  of  rhet 
oric  may  captivate  the  imagination,  but  material  facts  and  figures 
only  can  convince  the  judgment,  and  the  latter  I  will  endeavor  to 
render  as  little  tiresome  as  possible. 

The  commencement  of  hostilities  in  Charleston  harbor,  the  proc 
lamation  of  Lincoln,  calling  for  troops  to  make  an  unconstitu 
tional  war  on  the  seceded  States,  and  the  consequent  secession  of 
Virginia,  found  General  Lee  a  Lieut.  Colonel  in  the  United  States 
army,  with  a  character  and  reputation  which  would  have  ensured 
him  the  highest  military  honors  within  the  gift  of  the  United  States 
Government.  In  fact,  it  has  been  said  that  the  command  of  the 
army  intended  for  the  invasion  of  the  South  was  tendered  him. 
However,  rejecting  all  overtures  made  to  him,  as  soon  as  he 
learned  the  action  of  his  native  State,  in  a  dignified  manner,  and 
without  parade  or  show,  he  tendered  his  resignation,  with  the 
determination  to  share  the  fate  of  his  State,  his  friends  and  kin 
dred.  The  then  Governor,  at  once,  with  the  unanimous  consent 


of  the  Convention  of  Virginia,  tendered  him  the  command  of  all 
the  forces  of  the  State.  This  he  accepted,  and  promptly  repaired 
to  Richmond,  to  enter  upon  the  discharge  of  his  duties,  knowing 
that  this  act  must  be  attended  with  a  very  heavy  pecuniary  loss  to 
himself  on  account  of  the  locality  of  his  estates.  Those  who  wit 
nessed  his  appearance  before  the  Convention,  saw  his  manly  bear 
ing,  and  heard  the  few  grave,  dignified  and  impressive  words  with 
which  he  consecrated  himself  and  his  sword  to  the  cause  of  his 
native  State,  can  never  forget  that  scene.  All  felt  at  once  that  we 
had  a  leader  worthy  of  the  State  and  the  cause. 

As  a  member  of  the  military  committee  of  the  Convention,  and 
afterwards  as  a  subordinate  under  him,  I  was  in  a  condition  to 
witness  and  know  the  active  energy  and  utter  abnegation  of  all 
personal  considerations  with  which  he  devoted  himself  to  the  work 
of  organizing  and  equipping  the  Virginia  troops  for  the  field. 
While  he  bore  no  active  part  in  the  first  military  operations  of  the 
war,  yet,  1  can  safely  say  that,  but  for  the  capacity  and  energy  dis 
played  by  General  Lee,  in  organizing  and  equipping  troops  to  be 
sent  to  the  front,  our  army  would  not  have  been  in  a  condition  to 
gain  the  first  victory  at  Manassas.  I  do  not,  however,  intend,  by 
this  statement,  to  detract  from  the  merit  of  others.  The  Confede 
rate  Government,  then  recently  removed  to  Richmond,  did  well 
its  part  in  bringing  troops  from  the  South ;  and  I  take  pleasure  in 
bearing  testimony  to  the  fidelity  and  ability  with  which  the  then 
Governor  of  Virginia  cooperated  with  General  Lee  in  his  efforts 
to  furnish  men  as  well  as  the  munitions  of  war. 

His  first  appearance  in  the  field,  as  a  commander,  was  in  West 
ern  Virginia,  after  the  reverses  in  that  quarter.  The  expectations 
formed  in  regard  to  his  operations  there  were  not  realized,  and, 
though  he  met  with  no  disaster  or  defeat  to  his  troops,  the  cam 
paign  was  regarded  as  a  failure.  The  public  never  thought  of 
inquiring  into  the  causes  of  that  failure,  and  it  is  not  to  be  denied 
that  an  impression  prevailed  among  those  who  did  not  know  him 
well,  that  General  Lee  was  not  suited  to  be  a  commander  in  an 


6 


active  campaign.  There  were  some  editors  who,  while  safely  en 
trenched  behind  the  impregnable  columns  of  their  newspapers, 
proved  themselves  to  be  as  fierce  in  war  as  they  had  been  wise  in 
peace,  and  no  bad  representatives  of  the  snarling  Thersites,  and 
these  hurled  their  criticisms  and  taunts,  with  no  sparing  hand,  at 
the  head  of  the  unsuccessful  commander.  It  would  be  profitless, 
now,  to  inquire  into  the  causes  of  the  failures  in  Western  Vir 
ginia.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  they  were  not  attributable  to  the 
want  of  capacity  or  energy  in  the  commanding  General. 

He  was,  subsequently,  sent  to  the  Southern  sea-board,  for  the 
purpose  of  supervising  the  measures  for  its  defence,  and  he  proved 
himself  a  most  accomplished  engineer,  and  rendered  most  valuable 
services  in  connection  with  the  sea-board  defences  in  that  quarter. 

In  March,  1862,  he  was  called  to  Richmond  and  assigned  to 
the  important  position  of  military  adviser  to  the  President.  Just 
before  that  time  the  evacuation  of  Manassas  took  place,  and  subse 
quently  the  transfer  of  the  bulk  of  the  opposing  armies  in  Vir 
ginia  to  the  Peninsula,  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown  and  the  line  of 
"Warwick  River,  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  and  the  transfer  of  the 
seat  of  war  to  the  Chickahominy,  in  the  vicinity  of  Richmond, 
occurred. 

On  the  31st  of  May  and  1st  of  June,  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines 
was  fought,  and  General  Johnston  was  so  severely  wounded  as  to 
be  disabled  for  duty  in  the  field  for  some  time.  Fortunately, 
the  eminent  and  patriotic  statesman,  who  was  at  the  head  of  the 
Government,  well  knew  the  merits  of  General  Lee,  and  at  once 
assigned  him  to  the  vacant  command;  and  then  in  fact  began  that 
career  to  which  I  invite  your  attention. 

When  General  Lee  assumed  command  of  the  army,  which  before 
that  time  had  borne  the  name  of  the  "Army  of  the  Potomac,"  but 
was  soon  re-christened  by  the  name  of  the  "  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,"  he  found  the  Confederate  Capital  beleaguered  by  an 
army  of  over  one  hundred  thousand  men,  with  a  very  large  train 
of  field  and  siege  guns,  while  his  own  force  was  very  little  more 


than  half  that  of  the  enemy.  Nevertheless,  he  conceived  the  idea 
of  relieving  the  capital  of  the  threatening  presence  of  the  besieging 
army,  by  one  of  those  bold  strategic  movements  of  which  only 
great  minds  are  capable.  General  Jackson,  by  his  rapid  move 
ments  and  brilliant  operations  in  the  Valley,  had  prevented  the 
march  of  a  column  of  about  forty  thousand  men,  under  McDowell, 
from  Fredericksburg  on  Richmond,  to  unite  with  the  besieging 
army ;  and  a  part  of  McDowell's  force,  and  Fremont's  army  from 
Northwestern  Virginia,  had  been  sent  to  the  Valley,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  crushing  Jackson.  It  was  very  apparent  that  Jackson's 
force,  then  consisting  of  his  own  command  proper,  Johnson's  com 
mand  from  Alleghany  Mountain,  and  Ewell's  division,  could  not 
long  withstand  the  heavy  forces  concentrating  against  it,  and  that*, 
when  it  was  overwhelmed,  the  enemy's  troops  operating  in  the 
Valley  and  covering  Washington,  would  be  at  liberty  to  move  on 
Richmond ;  while  the  detachment,  from  the  army  defending  that 
city,  of  a  force  large  enough  to  enable  Jackson  to  contend  suc 
cessfully,  in  a  protracted  campaign,  with  the  forces  accumulating 
against  him,  would,  probably,  ensure  the  fall  of  the  Confederate 
Capital.  Preparations  were,  therefore,  made  to  attack  the  besieg 
ing  army,  with  the  forces  covering  Richmond  and  in  the  Valley, 
by  a  combined  movement.  Some  reinforcements  were  brought 
from  the  South,  and  three  brigades  were  sent  to  the  Valley,  for  the 
purpose  of  deceiving  the  enemy,  and  facilitating  the  withdrawal 
of  General  Jackson.  Fortunately,  that  able  and  energetic  com 
mander  had  been  enabled  to  prevent  the  junction  of  Fremont's 
army  with  the  troops  sent  from  McDowell's  command,  and, 
taking  advantage  of  their  separation  and  the  swollen  condition 
of  the  water  courses,  had  defeated  both  forces  in  succession,  and 
so  bewildered  their  commanders  by  the  rapidity  of  his  movements, 
that  they  retreated  down  the  Valley,  under  the  apprehension  that 
Washington  was  in  danger.  Leaving  all  of  his  cavalry  but  one 
regiment  to  watch  the  enemy  and  mask  his  own  movement,  Gen 
eral  Jackson,  on  the  17th  of  June,  commenced  his  march  towards 


8 


the  enemy's  lines  near  Richmond,  in  compliance  with  the  plan  and 
orders  of  General  Lee ;  and  on  the  26th  of  June,  less  than  four 
weeks  after  General  Lee  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of 
the  army,  his  attacking  columns  swung  around  McClellan's  right 
flank,  and  fell  like  an  avalanche  on  the  besieging  army.  Next 
day,  Jackson  was  up,  and  then  ensued  that  succession  of  bril 
liant  engagements  which  so  much  accelerated  McClellan's  famous 
"  change  of  base,"  and  sent  his  shattered  army  to  Harrison's  Land 
ing  under  cover  of  the  gun-boats  on  the  James. 

To  give  you  some  idea  of  the  boldness  and  daring  of  this  move 
ment,  and  the  impression  it  made  on  the  enemy,  I  will  call  your 
attention  to  some  facts  and  figures. 

In  his  report,  dated  in  August,  1863,  and  printed  in  1864, 
McClellan  gives  the  strength  of  the  troops  under  his  command  at 
Washington,  on  the  Potomac  and  within  reach,  on  the  1st  of 
March,  1862,  as : 

"  Present  for  duty,  one  hundred  and  ninety-three  thousand  one 
hundred  and  forty-two." 

A  portion  of  this  force  had  been  left  to  operate  in  the  Valley, 
another  to  cover  Washington  ;  and  he  puts  the  strength  of  "  The 
Army  of  the  Potomac,"  which  designation  his  army  bore,  on  the 
20th  day  of  June,  1862,  just  six  days  before  the  battles  began,  at : 

"  Present  for  duty,  one  hundred  and  five  thousand  eight  hun 
dred  and  twenty-five." 

He  further  says  that  he  had  sixty  batteries  with  his  army, 
aggregating  three  hundred  and  forty  field  pieces.  Besides  these 
he  had  a  large  train  of  siege  guns. 

General  Lee's  whole  force,  of  all  arms,  including  the  troops  of 
Magruder,  Huger,  Holmes  and  Jackson,  when  the  latter  arrived, 
did  not  reach  eighty  thousand  effective  men,  and  of  these,  Holmes' 
command,  over  six  thousand  strong,  did  not  actively  engage  in 
any  of  the  battles.  There  were  thirty-nine  brigades  of  infantry  in 
all  engaged  on  our  side  in  the  battles  around  Richmond,  inclusive 
of  Holmes'  command.  The  strength  of  twenty-three  of  them  is 


9 


given  in  the  official  reports,  and  was  forty-seven  thousand  and 
thirty-four,  including  the  batteries  attached  to  a  number  of  them. 
In  these  were  embraced  the  very  largest  brigades  in  the  army,  as 
for  instance,  Lawton's.  The  sixteen  brigades,  whose  strength  is 
not  given,  were  four  of  A.  P.  Hill's,  two  of  Longstreet's,  two  of 
Huger's  and  eight  of  Jackson's.  Taking  the  average  of  those 
whose  strength  is  given,  for  the  eight  brigades  of  A.  P.  Hill, 
Longstreet  and  Huger,  and  an  average  of  fifteen  hundred  for 
Jackson's  eight  brigades — which  would  be  a  very  liberal  estimate, 
considering  the  heavy  fighting  and  long  and  rapid  marches  they 
had  gone  through — and  it  will  give  about  seventy-five  thousand 
men,  including  a  number  of  batteries  attached  to  the  brigades. 
The  cavalry  with  the  army  was  less  than  two  brigades,  and  that, 
with  the  artillery  not  included  in  the  reports  of  brigades,  could 
not  have  reached  five  thousand  men.  The  field  guns  with  our 
army,  which  were  all  that  were  used,  were  not  near  half  as  many 
as  those  of  the  enemy,  and  many  of  them  were  of  inferior  mettle 
and  pattern.  We  had  not,  then,  had  an  opportunity  of  supplying 
ourselves  with  the  improved  guns  of  the  enemy.  Much  the  largest 
portion  of  our  small  arms  consisted  of  the  smooth  bore  musket, 
while  the  enemy  was  well  supplied  with  improved  rifle  muskets. 
From  the  data  I  have  given,  you  will  perceive  that  I  have  not 
underestimated  the  strength  of  the  forces  at  General  Lee's  com 
mand  ;  and  this  was  the  largest  army  he  ever  commanded.  The 
idea  of  relieving  Richmond,  by  an  attack  on  McClellan's  flank 
and  rear,  was  a  masterly  conception,  and  the  boldness,  not  to  say 
audacity,  of  it,  will  appear  when  we  take  into  consideration  the 
relative  strength  of  the  two  armies,  and  the  fact  that,  in  swinging 
around  the  enemy's  flank,  General  Lee  left  very  little  over  twenty- 
five  thousand  men  between  the  Capital  and  the  besieging  army. 
Timid  minds  might  regard  this  as  rashness,  but  it  was  the  very 
perfection  of  a  profound  and  daring  strategy.  Had  McClellan 
advanced  to  the  assault  of  the  city,  through  the  open  plains  around 
it,  his  destruction  would  have  been  ensured.  As  it  was,  his  only 


10 


chance  for  escape  was  in  a  retreat  through  the  swamps  and  forests, 
which  concealed  and  sheltered  his  columns  on  their  flight  to  the 
banks  of  the  James.  Notwithstanding  the  favorable  nature  of  the 
country  for  his  escape,  McClellan's  army  would  have  been  annihi 
lated,  had  General  Lee's  orders  been  promptly  and  rigidly  carried 
out  by  his  subordinates.  The  bloody  battle  of  Malvern  Hill 
would  not  have  been  fought ;  and  when  it  was  fought,  a  crushing 
defeat  would  have  been  inflicted  on  the  enemy,  had  the  plans  of 
the  commanding  General  been  carried  into  execution,  as  I  could 
demonstrate  to  you,  if  it  were  profitable  to  enter  into  such  a  dis 
quisition.  McClellan  was  glad  enough  to  escape  from  that  field 
with  his  shattered  forces,  though  he  pretended  to  claim  a  victory  ; 
and  the  pious  Lincoln  gave  "  ten  thousand  thanks  for  it." 

McClellan  always  insisted  that  we  had  overwhelming  numbers 
against  him,  and  this  hallucination  seems  to  have  haunted  him 
until  the  close  of  his  career,  if  he  is  yet  rid  of  it.  On  the  night  of 
the  25th  of  June,  he  telegraphed  to  Stanton,  as  follows : 

"  I  incline  to  think  that  Jackson  will  attack  my  right  and  rear. 
The  rebel  force  is  stated  at  two  hundred  thousand,  including  Jack 
son  and  Beauregard.  I  shall  have  to  contend  against  vastly  supe 
rior  odds  if  these  reports  be  true.  But  this  army  will  do  all  in 
the  power  of  men  to  hold  their  position,  and  repulse  any  attack." 

In  his  report,  he  says : 

"  The  report  of  the  chief  of  the  '  secret  service  corps '  herewith 
forwarded,  and  dated  the  26th  of  June,  [1862,]  shows  the  esti 
mated  strength  of  the  enemy,  at  the  time  of  the  evacuation  of 
Yorktown,  to  have  been  from  one  hundred  thousand  to  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty  thousand.  The  same  report  puts  his  numbers, 
on  the  26th  of  June,  at  about  one  hundred  and  eighty  thousand, 
and  the  specific  information  obtained  regarding  their  organization 
warrants  the  belief  that  this  estimate  did  not  exceed  his  actual 
strength." 

He  missed  it  by  only  one  hundred  thousand,  and  his  statement 
shows  the  impression  made  on  him,  by  the  fighting  of  our  army 


11 


under  Qeneral  Lee,  and  which  he  never  got  over.  All  the  time 
he  was  at  his  "new  base,"  he  was  afflicted  with  this  dread  phan 
tom  of  overwhelming  numbers  against  him,  which,  according  to 
his  account,  were  being  constantly  increased,  and  he  begged  most 
earnestly  for  reinforcements.  Halleck,  then  lately  appointed  corn- 
raander-in-chief  at  Washington,  visited  Harrison's  Landing  about 
the  last  of  July,  and  after  he  got  back,  he  reported,  in  writing,  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  that  McClellan  and  his  officers  represented 
our  forces,  then,  at  not  less  than  two  hundred  thousand,  and  his 
own  force  at  about  ninety  thousand. 

A  new  commander  had  now  appeared  in  Virginia,  on  the  north 
of  the  Eapidan,  in  the  person  of  Major-General  John  Pope,  whose 
head-quarters  were  in  the  saddle,  who  had  never  seen  anything  of 
the  "  rebels  "  but  their  backs,  and  who  felt  no  concern  whatever 
about  strength  of  positions,  bases  of  supplies,  or  lines  of  retreat. 
All  he  wanted  to  know,  was,  where,  the  "  rebels  "  were,  so  that  he 
might  "  go  at  them ;"  and  he  left  the  lines  of  retreat  to  take 
care  of  themselves,  while  the  enemy's  country  was  to  be  the 
base  of  his  supplies.  His  army,  according  to  his  own  statement, 
amounted  to  over  forty-three  thousand  men.  General  Jackson 
had  been  quietly  sent  up  to  Gordonsville,  with  his  own  and 
Ewell's  divisions,  which  were  soon  followed  by  that  of  A.  P. 
Hill.  While  McClellan  was  trembling  at  the  idea  of  vastly 
superior  numbers  accumulating  against  him,  Pope  telegraphed 
to  Halleck  : 

1  "  The  enemy  is  reported  to  be  evacuating  Richmond,  and  falling 
back  on  Danville  and  Lynchburg." 

General  Jackson  soon  began  to  show  Pope  some  things  that 
were  entirely  new  to  him.  The  battle  of  Cedar  Run  or  Slaughter's 
Mountain,  was  fought  on  the  9th  of  August,  and  "  a  change  came 
over  the  spirit "  of  Pope's  dream.  In  fact,  he  began  to  see  some 
remarkable  sights,  with  which  he  was  destined  to  soon  become 
familiar.  About  this  time,  McClellan  sent  a  despatch  to  Halleck, 
in  which  is  this  striking  passage: 


12 


"  I  don't  like  Jackson's  movements ;  he  will  suddenly  appear 
when  least  expected.'7 

There  were  not  many,  on  that  side,  who  did  like  General  Jack 
son's  ways.  The  authorities  at  Washington  were  completely  be 
wildered  by  his  new  eccentricities,  and  the  evacuation  of  the  "  new 
base,"  which  had  been  assumed  with  so  much  ability  and  celerity, 
was  preremptorily  ordered. 

Burnside  soon  arrived  at  Fredericksburg  with  thirteen  thousand 
men,  brought  from  North  and  South  Carolina,  eight  thousand  of 
whom,  under  Reno,  were  sent  to  Pope.  In  the  meantime,  General 
Lee  had  been  watching  McClellan's  force,  and,  having  become 
convinced  that  there  was  no  immediate  danger  to  Richmond,  he 
determined  to  move  against  Pope,  for  the  purpose  of  crushing  him 
before  he  could  be  reinforced,  and  entirely  relieving  Richmond, 
by  forcing  McClellan  to  go  to  the  defence  of  Washington.  Leav 
ing  D.  H.  Hill's  and  McLaws'  divisions,  two  brigades  under 
J.  G.  Walker,  a  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Hampton,  and  some 
other  troops  at  Drury's  and  Chaffin's  Bluffs,  10  watch  McClellan, 
General  Lee  moved  with  the  remainder  of  his  army  to  the  Rapi- 
dan.  Getting  wind  of  the  intended  movement  against  him,  by 
the  accidental  capture  of  a  despatch  to  Stuart,  Pope  fell  back 
behind  the  Rappahannock,  and  the  two  armies  soon  confronted 
each  other  on  its  banks.  A  raid  by  Stuart  to  Pope's  rear,  resulted 
in  the  capture  of  the  latter 's  head-quarters  and  his  correspondence, 
which  latter  showed  that  McClellan's  army  was  hastening  to 
Pope's  assistance.  D.  H.  Hill,  McLaws,  Walker  and  Hampton, 
were  ordered  forward  at  once,  and  while  Pope  was  looking  steadily 
to  the  front  for  the  "  rebels,"  without  thought  for  his  base  of  sup 
plies,  and  in  utter  oblivion  of  any  possible  line  of  retreat,  General 
Jackson  was  sent  on  that  remarkably  bold  and  dashing  expedition 
to  the  enemy's  rear,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  Pope's  commu 
nications,  and  preventing  the  advance  of  McClellan's  army  to  his 
assistance.  Pope  now  found  it  necessary  to  look  out  for  his  sup 
plies  and  his  line  of  retreat,  and  then  ensued  that  series  of  engage- 


13 


ments  called  "the  second  battle  of  Manassas."  Pope  had  already 
been  joined  by  two  corps  of  McClellan's  army,  Porter's  and 
Heintzelman's,  the  one  by  the  way  of  Fredericksburg  and  the 
other  over  the  railroad ;  and  Jackson's  three  divisions,  numbering 
less  than  twenty  thousand  men,  after  cutting  the  railroad,  and 
destroying  several  trains  of  cars  and  immense  stores  at  Manassas, 
which  could  not  be  removed  for  want  of  transportation,  withstood 
for  two  days,  beginning  on  the  28th  of  August,  Pope's  entire 
army,  reinforced  by  Reno's  eight  thousand  men  and  McClellan's 
two  corps,  while  General  Lee  was  moving  up  with  Longstreet's 
and  Anderson's  commands.  Never  did  General  Jackson  display 
his  leading  characteristics  more  conspicuously  than  on  this  occa 
sion,  and  he  fully  justified  the  confidence  of  the  commanding 
General,  in  entrusting  him  with  the  execution  of  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  and  daring  strategic  movements  on  record.  Every  attack 
by  Pope's  immense  army  was  repulsed  with  heavy  slaughter,  and 
during  the  29th  all  the  fighting  on  our  side  was  done  by  Jack 
son's  corps,  except  an  affair  about  dusk  between  a  part  of 
McDowell's  corps  and  the  advance  of  Longstreet's  command, 
which  began  to  arrive  between  eleven  and  twelve  in  the  day,  but 
did  not  become  engaged  until  at  the  close,  when  an  advance  was 
made,  along  the  Warrenton  Pike,  by  one  of  McDowell's  divisions, 
under  the  very  great  delusion  that  Jackson  was  retreating.  On 
the  morning  of  the  30th  the  attacks  on  Jackson's  position,  on  the 
line  of  an  unfinished  railroad  track,  were  renewed,  and  continued 
until  the  afternoon,  with  the  same  result  as  the  day  before.  Long- 
street  did  not  become  engaged  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  when, 
by  a  combined  attack,  Pope's  army  was  driven  across  Bull  Run 
in  great  disorder  and  with  immense  loss. 

Pope's  report  and  telegraphic  correspondence  afford  a  rich  fund 
of  amusement  for  those  acquainted  with  the  facts  of  his  brief  cam 
paign  in  Virginia,  but  this  I  must  pass  over. 

He  claimed  to  have  entirely  defeated  and  routed  Jackson  on 
the  29th,  and  he  actually  had  one  corps  commander  cashiered,  for 


14 


not  cutting  off  the  retreat  and  capturing  the  whole  force,  which 
he  claims  to  have  routed.  In  a  despatch  to  Halleck,  dated  5.30 
A.  M.,  on  the  30th,  he  says : 

"We  have  lost  not  less  than  eight  thousand  men,  killed  and 
wounded;  but  from  the  appearance  of  the  field,  the  enemy  lost  at 
least  two  to  one.  He  stood  strictly  on  the  defensive,  and  every 
assault  was  made  by  ourselves.  The  battle  was  fought  on  the 
identical  field  of  Bull  Run,  which  greatly  increased  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  men.  The  news  just  reaches  me  from  the  front  that  the 
enemy  is  retiring  toward  the  mountains.  I  go  forward  at  once  to 
see.  We  have  made  great  captures,  but  I  am  not  able,  yet,  to 
form  an  idea  of  their  extent/' 

He  went  forward,  and  saw  more  than  was  agreeable  to  him, 
and  found  that  he  had  captured  a  <(  Tartar." 

In  a  despatch  dated  9.45  P.  M.,  on  the  30th,  after  the  great 
battle  of  that  day  was  over,  he  said : 

"  The  battle  was  most  furious  for  hours  without  cessation,  and 
the  losses  on  both  sides  were  very  heavy.  The  enemy  is  badly 
whipped,  and  we  shall  do  well  enough.  Do  not  be  uneasy.  We 
will  hold  our  own  here." 

To  this  Halleck  replied  on  the  morning  of  the  31st: 

"  You  have  done  nobly.  Don't  yield  another  inch  if  you  can 
avoid  it.  All  reserves  are  being  sent  forward." 

Yet,  after  all  of  McClellan's  troops,  except  one  division  left  at 
Yorktown,  had  arrived,  and  before  another  gun  had  been  fired, 
Pope  telegraphed  to  Halleck,  at  10.45  A.  M.,  on  the  31st: 

"  I  should  like  to  know  whether  you  feel  secure  about  Wash 
ington,  should  this  army  be  destroyed.  I  shall  fight  it  as  long  as 
a  man  will  stand  up  to  the  work." 

The  army  that  had  been  so  badly  whipped  on  the  30th,  was 
soon  advancing  against  Pope  again.  Jackson,  by  another  flank 
movement,  struck  the  retreating  army  at  Chantilly  or  Ox  Hill, 
and  the  shattered  remains  of  it,  now  reinforced  by  two  fresh  corps 
and  a  division  of  McClellan's  army,  were  hurled  into  the  fortifica 
tions  around  Washington. 


15 


Major  General  John  Pope  had  now  seen  as  much  of  the  "rebels" 
as  he  cared  to  look  upon,  and  he  disappeared  from  the  scene  of 
action,  in  many  respects,  "a  wiser  if  not  a  better  man."  To  get 
him  as  far  as  possible  from  the  dangerous  proximity,  he  was  sent 
to  the  extreme  Northwest,  to  look  after  the  red  men  of  the  plains. 
.When  we  recollect  the  bombastic  proclamations  and  orders  of 
Pope,  at  the  beginning  of  his  brief  campaign,  and  the  rapidity 
with  which  he  was  brought  to  grief,  there  appears  so  much  of  the 
ludicrous  in  the  whole  that  we  are  almost  tempted  to  overlook  the 
fiendish  malignity  which  characterized  some  of  his  orders  and  acts. 

In  his  report,  after  saying: 

"  Every  indication,  during  the  night  of  the  29th,  and  up  to  10 
o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  30th,  pointed  to  the  retreat  of  the 
enemy  from  our  front.'7 

He  further  says : 

"  During  the  whole  night  of  the  29th,  and  the  morning  of  the 
30th,  the  advance  of  the  main  army,  under  Lee,  was  arriving  on 
the  field  to  reinforce  Jackson,  so  that,  by  12  or  1  o'clock  in  the 
day,  we  were  confronted  by  forces  greatly  superior  to  our  own ; 
and  these  forces  were  being,  every  moment,  largely  increased  by 
fresh  arrivals  of  the  enemy  in  the  direction  of  Thoroughfare  Gap." 
So  that  this  was  another  case  of  overwhelming  numbers  on  our 
side. 

Pope's  army  was  originally,  according  to  his  statement,  forty- 
three  thousand,  and,  according  to  Halleck,  forty  thousand.  He 
had  been  reinforced  by  eight  thousand  men  under  Reno ;  a  body 
of  troops  from  the  Kanawha  Valley,  under  Cox ;  another  from 
Washington,  under  Sturgis,  and  all  of  McClellan's  army,  except 
one  division,  say  eighty-five  thousand  men.  General  Lee  had 
then  between  one  hundred  and  thirty-five  thousand  and  one  hun 
dred  and  forty  thousand  men  to  deal  with  on  this  occasion.  The 
whole  of  McClellan's  force  was  not  up  at  the  battle  of  the  30th, 
but  all  of  it,  except  the  one  division  of  Casey's  corps,  was  up  by 
the  time  of  the  affair  at  Ox  Hill,  on  the  1st  of  September.  Gene 
ral  Lee's  whole  force,  at  second  Manassas,  did  not  exceed  fifty 


16 


thousand  men.  Neither  D.  H.  Hill's,  nor  MeLaws',  nor  Wal 
ker's  division  of  infantry,  nor  Hampton's  brigade  of  cavalry 
had  arrived,  and  neither  of  them  got  up  until  after  the  affair 
at  Ox  Hill.  We  had  only  twenty-nine  brigades  of  infantry 
and  two  of  cavalry  present  at  second  Manassas,  one  of  the  latter 
being  very  weak.  One  of  the  infantry  brigades,  Starke's  Louisi 
ana  brigade,  had  been  formed  of  regiments  attached  to  other 
brigades  at  the  battles  around  Richmond,  and  another  had 
arrived  from  the  South  during  July.  This  latter  brigade  consti 
tuted  all  the  reinforcements,  except  men  returned  from  convales 
cence,  received  after  these  battles,  and  was  twenty-two  hundred 
strong,  the  last  of  July.  The  whole  force  in  the  department  of 
Northern  Virginia,  on  the  31st  of  July,  1862,  was  sixty-nine  thou 
sand  five  hundred  and  fifty-nine  for  duty.  Deduct,  rateably,  for 
the  twelve  infantry  brigades,  with  their  proportion  of  artillery, 
and  the  one  cavalry  brigade  absent,  besides  troops  on  detached 
duty  at  various  points,  and  you  will  see  how  General  Lee's  army 
must  have  been  under  fifty  thousand  at  second  Manassas.  Yet  it 
had  sent  the  combined  armies  of  Pope  and  McClellan  into  the 
defences  of  Washington,  in  a  very  crippled  condition,  and  thrown 
the  Government  there  into  a  great  panic  in  regard  to  the  safety  of 
that  city.  Fredericksburg  had  been  evacuated,  and  the  remainder 
of  Burnside's  corps  brought  to  Washington,  while  a  call  had  been 
made  for  three  hundred  thousand  new  troops. 

Notwithstanding  the  exhaustion  of  his  troops  from  the  heavy  tax 
on  all  their  energies — the  heavy  losses  in  battle,  and  the  want  of 
commissary  stores,  General  Lee  now  undertook  the  bold  scheme  of 
crossing  the  Potomac  into  Maryland,  with  his  army  reinforced  by 
the  eleven  brigades  of  infantry,  under  D.  H.  Hill,  McLaws  and 
Walker,  and  Hampton's  cavalry,  which  were  coming  up.  On  the 
3d  of  September,  our  army  was  put  in  motion,  and  passing  through 
Leesburg,  it  crossed  over  and  concentrated  at  and  near  Frederick 
city,  by  the  7th  of  the  month.  This  movement  threw  the  authori 
ties  at  Washington  into  great  consternation  and  dismay.  McClel- 


17 


Ian  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  all  the  troops  in  and 
around  Washington,  and  the  correspondence  between  himself  and 
Halleck,  conducted  mostly  by  telegraph,  shows  how  utterly  bewil 
dered  they  were.  Both  of  them  were  firmly  impressed  with  the 
conviction  that  our  numbers  were  overwhelming,  and  they  did 
not  know  where  to  look  for  the  impending  blow.  McClellan 
moved  out  of  the  city  with  great  caution,  feeling  his  way  grad 
ually  towards  Frederick,  while  a  considerable  force,  which  was 
constantly  augmented  by  the  arrival  of  new  troops,  was  retained 
at  Washington,  for  fear  that  city  should  be  captured  by  a  sudden 
coup  from  the  South-side.  A  considerable  force  had  been  isolated 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  General  Lee  sent  Jackson's  corps,  McLaws', 
Anderson's  and  Walker's  divisions,  in  all  twenty-six  brigades  of 
infantry,  with  the  accompanying  artillery,  to  invest  and  capture 
that  place,  retaining  with  himself  only  fourteen  brigades  of  infan 
try,  with  the  accompanying  and  reserve  artillery,  and  the  main 
body  of  the  cavalry,  with  which  he  crossed  to  the  West  side  of 
the  South  Mountain.  The  order  directing  these  movements,  by 
some  accident,  fell  into  McClellan's  hands  on  the  13th,  and  he 
hurried  his  troops  forward  to  attack  the  small  force  with  General 
Lee,  and  relieve  Harper's  Ferry  if  possible.  A  sanguinary  engage 
ment  occurred  at  Boonsboro'  Gap,  on  the  14th,  between  D.  H. 
Hill's  division,  constituting  the  rear  guard  of  the  column  with 
General  Lee,  and  the  bulk  of  McClellan's  army,  and  Hill,  after 
maintaining  his  position  for  many  hours,  was  compelled  to  retire 
at  night  with  heavy  loss,  the  troops  sent  to  his  assistance  not  hav 
ing  arrived  in  time  to  repulse  the  enemy.  That  night,  Long- 
street's  and  Hill's  commands  crossed  the  Antietam  to  Sharpsburg, 
where  they  took  position  on  the  morning  of  the  15th.  In  the 
meantime,  Harper's  Ferry  had  been  invested,  and  surrendered  on 
the  morning  of  the  loth — our  victory  being  almost  a  bloodless 
one,  so  far  as  the  resistance  of  the  garrison  was  concerned ;  but 
McLaws  and  Anderson  had  had  very  heavy  fighting  on  the  Mary 
land  side,  with  a  part  of  McClellan's  army.  As  soon  as  General 
2 


18 


Lee  heard  of  the  success  at  Harper's  Ferry,  he  ordered  all  the 
troops  operating  against  that  place  to  move  to  Sharpsburg  as  soon 
as  practicable.  Leaving  A.  P.  Hill,  with  his  division,  to  dispose 
of  the  prisoners  and  property  captured  at  Harper's  Ferry,  Gene 
ral  Jackson,  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  15th,  ordered  his  own 
division  and  Ewell's,  now  under  Lawton,  to  Sharpsburg,  where 
they  arrived  early  on  the  morning  of  the  16th.  Walker's  two  bri 
gades  came  up  later  in  the  day.  The  ten  brigades  brought  by 
Jackson  and  Walker  made  twenty-four  brigades  of  infantry,  with 
the  fourteen  already  on  the  ground,  which  General  Lee  had  with 
him  when  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg  opened  on  the  morning  of  the 
17th  of  September.  Jackson's  division  was  placed  on  the  left 
flank,  and  Hood's  two  brigades,  which  were  next  to  it  on  the 
right,  were  relieved  by  two  brigades  of  Ewell's  division  during  the 
night  of  the  16th,  and  these  were  reinforced  by  another  very  early 
the  next  morning.  General  Jackson's  whole  force  on  the  field 
consisted  of  five  thousand  infantry  and  a  very  few  batteries  of  his 
own  division.  One  brigade,  my  own,  numbering  about  one  thou 
sand  men  and  officers,  was  detached,  at  light,  towards  the  Poto 
mac  on  our  left,  to  support  some  artillery  with  which  Stuart  was 
operating ;  so  that  General  Jackson  had  only  four  thousand  infan 
try  in  line,  and  D.  H.  Hill  was  immediately  on  his  right,  holding 
the  centre  and  left  centre  with  his  division,  then  three  thousand 
strong.  General  Lee's  whole  infantry  force  on  the  field,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  battle,  did  not  exceed  fifteen  thousand  men, 
including  Jackson's  and  Walker's  commands.  On  the  left  and 
left  centre,  McClellan  hurled,  in  succession,  the  four  corps  of 
Hooker,  Mansfield,  Sumner  and  Franklin,  numbering,  in  the 
aggregate,  fifty-six  thousand  and  ninety-five  men,  according  to 
his  report;  and  a  sanguinary  battle  raged  fot  several  hours,  dur 
ing  which,  Hood's  two  brigades,  my  brigade,  Walker's  two  bri 
gades,  Anderson's  brigade  of  D.  R.  Jones'  division,  and  McLaws' 
and  Anderson's  divisions,  successively  went  to  the  support  of  the 
part  of  the  line  assailed,  at  different  points,  the  last  two  divisions 
having  arrived  late  in  the  morning,  during  the  progress  of  the 


19 


battle.  And  all  the  troops  engaged,  from  first  to  last,  with  the 
enemy's  fifty-six  thousand  and  ninety-five  men,  on  that  wing,  did 
not  exceed  eighteen  thousand  men.  At  the  close  of  the  fighting 
there,  our  left  was  advanced  beyond  where  it  rested  in  the  morn 
ing,  while  the  centre  had  been  forced  back  some  two  hundred 
yards. 

In  the  afternoon,  Burnside's  corps,  over  thirteen  thousand  strong, 
attacked  our  right,  and,  after  gaining  some  advantage,  was  driven 
back  with  the  aid  of  three  of  A.  P.  Hill's  brigades,  which  had 
just  arrived  from  Harper's  Ferry.  At  the  close  of  the  battle,  we 
held  our  position  firmly,  with  the  centre  slightly  forced  back,  as  I 
have  stated.  We  continued  to  hold  the  position  during  the  18th, 
and  McClellan  did  not  venture  to  renew  the  attack.  In  the  mean 
time,  heavy  reinforcements  were  moving  to  his  assistance,  two  divi 
sions  of  which,  Couch's  and  Humphrey's,  fourteen  thousand  strong, 
arrived  on  the  18th,  while  General  Lee  had  no  possibility  of  being 
reinforced  except  by  the  stragglers  who  might  come  up,  and  they 
constituted  a  poor  dependence.  The  Potomac  was  immediately 
in  his  rear,  and  as  it  would  have  been  folly  for  him  to  have  waited 
until  an  overpowering  force  was  accumulated  against  him,  he  very 
properly  and  judiciously  retired  on  the  night  of  the  18th,  and 
re-crossed  the  river  early  on  the  morning  of  the  19th.  A  very 
feeble  effort  at  pursuit  by  one  corps,  was  most  severely  punished 
by  A.  P.  Hill's  division  on  the  20th. 

This  was  one  of  the  most  remarkable  battles  of  the  war,  and 
has  been  but  little  understood.  You  will,  therefore,  pardon  me 
for  going  somewhat  into  detail  in  regard  to  it.  When  General 
Lee  took  his  position  on  the  morning  of  the  loth,  he  had  with 
him  but  fourteen  brigades  of  infantry,  besides  the  artillery  and 
cavalry.  The  official  reports  show  that  D.  H.  Hill's  five  brigades 
numbered  then  only  three  thousand  men  for  duty,  and  six  brigades 
under  D.  E.  Jones  only  two  thousand  four  hundred  and  thirty 
men.  The  strength  of  three  brigades  is  not  given,  but  they  were 
not  more  than  of  an  average  size — and  estimating  their  strength 
in  that  way,  it  would  give  less  than  seven  thousand  five  hundred 


20 


infantry  with  which,  and  the  artillery  and  cavalry  with  him, 
General  Lee  confronted  McClelland  army  during  the  whole  of 
the  15th  and  part  of  the  16th.  The  arrival  of  Jackson's -and 
Walker's  commands,  did  not  increase  the  infantry  to  more  than 
fifteen  thousand  men,  and  they  brought  very  little  artillery  with 
them.  During  the  day,  McLaws,  Anderson  and  A.  P.  Hill 
came  up  with  thirteen  brigades,  making  thirty-seven  brigades 
which  participated  in  the  battle.  The  official  reports  give  the 
strength  of  twenty-seven  of  these,  amounting  in  the  aggregate  to 
sixteen  thousand  nine  hundred  and  twenty-three  men.  Taking 
the  average  for  the  other  ten — and  they  were  not  more  than  aver 
age  brigades,  if  that — and  it  would  give  about  twenty-three  thou 
sand  infantry  engaged  on  our  side  from  first  to  last.  The  cavalry, 
consisting  of  three  brigades,  which  were  not  strong,  was  not  en 
gaged,  and  merely  watched  the  flanks.  A  very  large  portion  of 
our  artillery,  which  had  been  used  against  Harper's  Ferry,  had 
not  arrived,  and  did  not  get  up  until  after  night-fall,  when  the 
battle  was  over.  We  had  in  fact  comparatively  few  guns  engaged, 
and  the  enemy's  guns  were  not  only  very  numerous,  but  of  heavier 
mettle  and  longer  range.  Taking  the  whole  force,  including  the 
cavalry  and  the  artillery,  when  all  of  the  latter  had  arrived,  and 
we  had  less  than  thirty  thousand  men  of  all  arms  at  this  battle 
from  first  to  last.  General  Lee,  in  his  report,  says  that  he  had 
less  than  forty -thousand  men;  but,  for  reasons  that  can  be  well 
understood,  he  never  did  disclose  his  own  weakness  at  any  time, 
even  to  his  own  officers. 

When  our  army  started  for  Maryland,  after  the  affair  at  Ox 
Hill,  it  was  out  of  rations,  badly  clothed,  and  worse  shod.  At 
the  time  of  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg,  it  had  been  marching  and 
fighting  for  near  six  weeks,  and  the  straggling  from  exhaustion, 
sore  feet,  and  in  search  of  food,  had  been  terrible,  before  we 
crossed  the  Potomac.  When  it  is  recollected  that  the  entire  force 
at  the  end  of  July,  in  all  the  Department  of  Northern  Virginia, 
was  only  a  very  little  over  sixty-nine  thousand  men,  of  which 


21 


sixty  thousand,  including  D.  H.  Hill's,  McLaws'  and  Walker's 
divisions,  would  be  a  liberal  estimate  for  all  that  were  carried  into 
the  field,  you  will  see  that  a  loss  of  thirty  thousand  in  battle,  from 
Cedar  Run  to  South  Mountain,  inclusive,  and  from  the  other 
causes  named,  is  not  an  unreasonable  estimate.  In  fact,  at  the 
end  of  September,  when  the  stragglers  had  been  gathered  up,  and 
many  of  the  sick  and  wounded  had  returned  to  duty,  besides  the 
additions  from  the  conscripts,  the  official  returns  show  only  fifty- 
two  thousand  six  hundred  and  nine  for  duty  in  the  whole  Depart 
ment  of  Northern  Virginia. 

McClellan,  in  his  report,  gives  his  own  force  at  eighty-seven 
thousand  one  hundred  and  sixty-four  in  action,  and  he  gives  an 
estimate  of  General  Lee's  army,  in  detail,  in  which  he  places  our 
strength  at  ninety-seven  thousand  four  hundred  and  forty-five 
men  and  four  hundred  guns  at  this  battle.  Truly,  our  boys  in 
gray  had  a  wonderful  faculty  of  magnifying  and  multiplying 
themselves  in  battle ;  and  McClellan  could  not  have  paid  a 
higher  compliment  to  their  valor,  and  the  ability  of  our  com 
mander,  than  he  has  done  by  this  estimate  of  our  strength,  as  it 
appeared  to  him. 

In  giving  his  reasons  for  not  renewing  the  battle  on  the  18th, 
he  says  : 

"  One  division  of  Sumner's  corps,  and  all  of  Hooker's  corps,  on 
the  right,  had,  after  fighting  most  valiantly  for  several  hours,  been 
overpowered  by  numbers,  driven  in  great  disorder  and  much  scat 
tered,  so  that  they  were  for  the  time  somewhat  demoralized." 
I  have  shown  how  they  were  outnumbered. 
Burnside,  in  his  testimony  before  the  committee  on  the  conduct 
of  the  war,  said  : 

"  I  was  told  at  General  McClellan's  headquarters,  that  our  right 
had  been  so  badly  broken  that  they  could  not  be  got  together  for 
an  attack,  and  they  would  have  to  wait  for  reinforcements ;  and 
that  General  Sumner  advised  General  McClellan  not  to  renew  the 
attack,  because  of  the  condition  of  his  corps;  and  it  was  also  stated 
that  very  little  of  General  Hooker's  corps  was  left." 


This  was  on  the  night  of  the  17th,  after  the  battle  was  over. 
On  the  27th,  McClellan  wrote  to  Halleck  as  follows : 

"In  the  last  battles  the  enemy  was  undoubtedly  greatly  supe 
rior  to  us  in  numbers,  and  it  was  only  by  hard  fighting  that  we 
gained  the  advantage  we  did.  As  it  was,  the  result  was  at  one 
time  very  doubtful,  and  we  had  all  we  could  do  to  win  the  day." 

Win  the  day,  indeed !  He  had  not  dared  to  renew  the  attack 
on  the  18th,  and  he  did  not  venture  to  claim  a  victory  until  the 
19th,  when  he  found  General  Lee  had  re-crossed  the  Potomac, 
and  then  he  began  to  breathe  freely  and  to  crow,  at  first  feebly, 
and  then  more  loudly.  Who  ever  heard  of  a  victory  by  an  attack 
ing  army  in  an  open  field,  and  yet  the  victor  was  unable  to  ad 
vance  against  his  antagonist  who  stood  his  ground  ? 

To  give  you  some  idea  of  the  immense  difficulties  General  Lee 
had  to  encounter  in  this  campaign,  and  the  wonderful  facility  the 
enemy  had  for  raising  men,  and  reinforcing  his  armies  after  defeat, 
through  the  agencies  of  the  telegraph,  railroads  and  steam-power, 
let  me  tell  you  that  a  certified  statement  compiled  from  McClel- 
lan's  morning  report  of  the  20th  of  September,  1862,  contained  in 
the  report'of  the  committee  on  the  conduct  of  the  war,  shows  a 
grand  total  present  for  duty,  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  on  that 
day,  of  one  hundred  and  sixty-four  thousand  three  hundred  and 
fifty-nine,  of  which  seventy-one  thousand  two  hundred  and  ten 
were  in  the  defences  of  Washington,  under  Banks,  leaving  ninety- 
three  thousand  one  hundred  and  forty-nine  with  McClellan  in  the 
field  on  that  day.  A  very  large  portion  of  this  force  had  been 
accumulated,  by  means  of  the  railroads,  after  the  defeat  of  Pope 
You  may  understand,  now,  how  it  was  that  our  victories  could 
never  be  pressed  to  more  decisive  results.  It  was  genius,  and 
nerve,  and  valor,  on  the  one  side,  against  numbers  and  mechanical 
power  on  the  other;  even  the  lightning  of  the  heavens  being  made 
subservient  to  the  latter. 

You  may  also  form  some  conception  of  the  boldness  of  General 
Lee's  movement  across  the  Potomac,  the  daring  of  the  expedition 


23 


against  Harper's  Ferry  in  the  face  of  so  large  a  force,  and  the 
audacity  with  which  he  confronted  and  defied  McClellan's  army 
on  the  15th  and  16th,  and  then  fought  it  on  the  17th,  with  the 
small  force  he  had. 

Sharpsburg  was  no  defeat  to  our  arms,  though  our  army  was 
retired  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac  from  prudential  con 
siderations. 

Some  persons  have  been  disposed  to  regard  this  campaign  into 
Maryland  as  a  failure,  but  such  was  not  the  case.  It  is  true  that 
we  had  failed  to  raise  Maryland,  but  it  was  from  no  disaster  to 
our  arms. 

In  a  military  point  of  view,  however,  the  whole  campaign,  of 
which  the  movement  into  Maryland  was  an  integral  part,  had 
been  a  grand  success,  though  all  was  not  accomplished  which  our 
fond  hopes  caused  us  to  expect.  When  General  Lee  assumed 
command  of  the  army  at  Richmond,  a  besieging  army  of  immense 
size  and  resources,  was  in  sight  of  the  spires  of  the  Confederate 
Capital — all  Northern  Virginia  was  in  possession  of  the  enemy — 
the  Valley  overrun,  except  when  Jackson's  vigorous  and  rapid 
blows  sent  the  marauders  staggering  to  the  banks  of  the  Potomac 
for  a  brief  interval ;  and  Northwestern  Virginia,  including  the 
Ivanawha  Valley,  was  subjugated  and  in  the  firm  grasp  of  the 
enemy.  By  General  Lee's  bold  strategy  and  rapid  and  heavy 
blows,  the  Capital  had  been  relieved,  the  besieging  army  driven 
out  of  the  State,  the  enemy's  Capital  threatened,  his  country 
invaded,  Northern  Virginia  and  the  Valley  cleared  of  the  enemy, 
the  enemy's  troops  from  Northwestern  Virginia  and  the  Kanawha 
Valley  had  been  drawn  from  thence  for  the  defence  of  his  own 
Capital,  a  Confederate  force  had  penetrated  to  Charleston,  Kana 
wha,  our  whole  army  was  supplied  with  the  improved  fire-arm  in 
the  place  of  the  old  smooth  bore  'musket,  much  of  our  inferior  field 
artillery  replaced  by  the  enemy's  improved  guns,  and,  in  addition 
to  our  very  large  captures  of  prisoners  and  the  munitions  of  war 
elsewhere,  the  direct  result  of  the  march  across  the  Potomac  was 


24 


the  capture  of  eleven  thousand  prisoners,  seventy-three  pieces  of 
artillery,  and  thirteen  thousand  stand  of  excellent  small  arms,  and 
immense  stores  at  Harper's  Ferry.  And  at  the  close  of  the  cam 
paign,  the  Confederate  commander  stood  proudly  defiant  on  the 
extreme  northern  border  of  the  Confederacy,  while  his  opponent 
had  had  "  his  base "  removed  to  the  northern  bank  of  the  Poto 
mac,  at  a  point  more  than  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  miles 
from  the  Confederate  Capital,  in  a  straight  line.  In  addition,  the 
immense  army  of  McClellan  had  been  so  crippled,  that  it  was  not 
able  to  resume  the  offensive  for  six  weeks.  Such  had  been  the 
moral  effect  upon  the  enemy,  that  the  Confederate  Capital  was 
never  again  seriously  endangered,  until  the  power  of  the  Con 
federacy  had  been  so  broken  in  other  quarters,  and  its  available 
territory  so  reduced  in  dimensions,  that  the  enemy  could  concen 
trate  his  immense  resources  against  the  Capital. 

All  this  had  been  the  result  of  that  plan  of  operations,  of  which 
the  invasion  of  Maryland  formed  an  important  part.  Look  at  the 
means  placed  at  the  command  of  General  Lee,  and  the  immense 
numbers  and  resources  brought  against  him,  and  then  say  if  the 
results  accomplished  by  him  were  not  marvellous  ?  If  his  Gov 
ernment  had  been  able  to  furnish  him  with  men  and  means,  at 
all  commensurate  with  his  achievements  and  his  conceptions,  he 
would,  in  September,  1862,  have  dictated  the  terms  of  peace  in 
the  Capital  of  the  enemy.  But  all  the  wonderful  powers  of  the 
mechanic  arts  and  physical  science,  backed  by  unlimited  resources 
of  men  and  money,  still  continued  to  operate  against  him. 

A  certified  statement  from  McClellan's  morning  report  of  the 
30th  of  September,  contained  in  the  document  from  which  I  have 
already  quoted,  showed,  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  a  grand 
total  of  one  hundred  and  seventy-three  thousand  seven  hundred 
and  forty-five  present  for  duty  on  that  day,  of  which  seventy- 
three  thousand  six  hundred  and  one  were  in  the  defences  of 
Washington,  and  one  hundred  thousand  one  hundred  and  forty- 
four,  with  him  in  the  field ;  and  a  similar  statement  showed,  on 


25 


the  20th  of  October,  a  grand  total  of  two  hundred  and  seven 
thousand  and  thirty-six  present  for  duty  on  that  day,  of  which 
seventy-three  thousand  five  hundred  and  ninety-three  were  in  the 
defences  of  Washington,  and  one  hundred  and  thirty-three  thous 
and  four  hundred  and  forty-three  with  McClellan  in  the  field. 

At  the  close  of  October,  according  to  the  official  returns,  now 
on  file  at  the  "Archive  Office"  in  Washington,  the  whole  Con 
federate  force  for  duty,  in  the  department  of  Northern  Virginia, 
amounted  to  sixty-seven  thousand  eight  hundred  and  five.  A  con 
siderable  portion  of  this  force  was  not  with  General  Lee  in  the 
field. 

At  the  close  of  October,  McClellan  commenced  a  new  move 
ment,  with  his  immense  army,  across  the  Potomac,  East  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  while  General  Lee  was  yet  in  the  Valley.  As  this 
movement  was  developed,  Longstreet's  corps,  and  the  cavalry 
tinder  Stuart,  were  promptly  moved  to  intercept  it,  Jackson's 
corps  being  left  in  the  Valley.  McClellan  was  soon  superseded 
in  {he 'command  by  Burn  side,  and  when  the  latter  turned  his 
steps  towards  the  heights  opposite  Fredericksburg,  Jackson  was 
ordered  to  rejoin  the  rest  of  the  army.  In  the  meantime,  Burn- 
side's  attempt  to  approach  Richmond  on  the  new  line  had  been 
checkmated,  and  he  soon  found  himself  confronted  on  the  Kappa- 
bannock  by  the  whole  of  General  Lee's  army.  That  army  had  to 
be  stretched  out,  for  some  thirty  miles,  up  and  down  the  river,  to 
watch  the  different  crossings.  The  enemy  began  his  movement  to 
cross  at  and  near  Fredericksburg,  on  the  morning  of  the  llth  of 
December,  and  the  crossing  was  resisted  and  delayed  for  many 
hours,  but  owing  to  the  peculiar  character  of  the  country  imme 
diately  on  the  South  bank,  and  the  advantage  the  enemy  had  in 
his  commanding  position  on  the  North  bank,  from  whence  the 
wide  plains  on  the  South  bank,  and  the  town  of  Fredericksburg, 
were  completely  commanded  and  swept  by  an  immense  armament 
of  heavy  artillery,  that  crossing  could  not  be  prevented.  Our 
army  was  rapidly  concentrated,  and  took  its  position  on  the 


26 


heights  and  range  of  hills  in  rear  of  the  town  and  the  plains 
below ;  and  when  the  heavy  columns  of  the  enemy  advanced  to 
the  assault  on  the  13th,  first  on  our  right,  near  Hamilton's  cross 
ing,  and  then  on  our  left,  in  rear  of  Fredericksburg,  they  were 
hurled  back,  with  immense  slaughter,  to  the  cover  of  the  artillery 
on  the  opposite  heights,  and  every  renewal  of  the  assault  met  the 
same  fate.  In  this  battle,  we  stood  entirely  on  the  defensive, 
except  once,  when  the  enemy  penetrated  an  interval  in  our  line 
near  the  right  flank,  and  three  of  my  brigades  advanced,  driving 
and  pursuing  the  enemy  into  the  plains  below,  until  he  reached 
the  protection  of  his  artillery  and  the  main  line.  Burnside's  loss 
was  so  heavy,  and  his  troops  were  so  worsted  in  the  assaults  which 
had  been  made,  that  his  principal  officers  protested  against  a  re 
newal  of  the  attack,  and  on  the  night  of  the  15th,  he  re-crossed 
to  the  North  bank. 

In  this  battle,  he  had  all  of  McClellan's  army,  except  the 
twelfth  corps,  which  was  eight  or  ten  thousand  strong  and  had 
been  left  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  in  lieu  of  that  he  had  a  much 
larger  corps,  the  third,  from  the  defences  of  Washington.  In  his 
testimony  before  the  committee  on  the  conduct  of  the  war,  he  says 
he  had  one  hundred  thousand  men  across  the  river,  and  he  wras 
doubtful  which  had  the  superiority  of  numbers.  In  reply  to  a 
question  as  to  the  causes  of  the  failure  of  the  attack,  he  frankly 
said  : 

"  It  was  found  to  be  impossible  to  get  the  men  up  to  the  works. 
The  enemy's  fire  was  too  hot  for  them." 

Our  whole  force  present,  was  not  much  more  than  half  that  of 
the  enemy,  which  crossed  over  to  the  south  side  of  the  river. 
This  signal  victory,  in  which  the  enemy's  loss  was  very  heavy  and 
ours  comparatively  light,  closed  the  operations  for  the  year  1862. 

Some  newspaper  critics  and  fireside  Generals  were  not  satisfied 
with  the  results  of  this  victory,  and  thought  Burnside's  army 
ought  to  have  been  destroyed  before  it  went  back ;  and  there  were 
some  absurd  stories  about  propositions  alleged  to  have  been  made 


27 


by  General  Jackson,  for  driving  the  enemy  into  the  river.  That 
great  soldier  did  begin  a  forward  movement,  about  sunset,  which 
I  was  to  have  led,  but  just  as  my  men  were  moving  off,  he  coun 
termanded  the  movement,  because  the  enemy  opened  such  a  ter 
rific  artillery  fire  from  the  Stafford  Heights  and  from  behind  the 
heavy  embankments  on  the  road  leading  through  the  bottoms  on 
the  southside  of  the  river,  that  it  was  apparent  that  nothing  could 
have  lived  in  the  passage  across  the  plain  of  about  a  mile  in  width, 
over  which  we  would  have  had  to  advance,  to  reach  the  enemy 
massed  in  that  road.  According  to  the  statements  of  himself  and 
officers,  before  the  committee  on  the  conduct  of  the  war,  Franklin, 
who  commanded  the  enemy's  left,  had,  confronting  our  right,  from 
fifty-five  to  sixty  thousand  men,  of  whom  only  about  twenty  thou 
sand  had  been  under  fire.  The  bulk  of  that  force  was  along  the 
Bowling  Green  road,  running  parallel  to  the  river  through  the 
middle  of  the  bottoms,  and  behind  the  very  compact  and  thick 
embankments  on  each  side  of  that  road.  He  had  taken  over  with 
him  one  hundred  and  sixteen  pieces  of  artillery,  and  there  were 
sixty-one  pieces  on  the  North  bank,  some  of  which  were  of  very 
large  calibre,  so  posted  as  to  cover  the  bridges  on  that  flank  and 
sweep  the  plain  in  his  front.  Some  of  these  were  also  crossed  over 
to  him,  and  General  Hunt,  Burnside's  chief  of  artillery,  says,  fifty 
or  sixty  more  pieces  could  have  been  spared  from  their  right,  if 
necessary.  The  attempt  to  drive  this  force  into  the  river,  would 
have,  therefore,  ensured  our  destruction. 

Franklin  had  eight  divisions  with  him,  while  at  Fredericksburg, 
confronting  our  left,  were  ten  divisions,  fully  as  strong,  certainly, 
as  Franklin's  eight,  and  there  were  quite  as  many  guns  on  that 
flank.  It  is  true  the  enemy's  loss  there  had  been  double  that  in 
front  of  our  right,  but  he  still  had  a  large  number  of  troops  on 
that  flank  which  had  not  been  engaged.  The  character  of  the 
ground  in  front  of  our  position,  on  that  flank,  was  such  that  cur 
troops  could  not  be  moved  down  the  rugged  slopes  of  the  hills  in 
any  order  of  battle,  and  any  attempt  to  advance  them  must  have 


28 


been  attended  with  disastrous  consequences.  Burnside's  troops 
were  not  so  demoralized,  as  to  prevent  him  from  being  anxious  to 
renew  the  attack  on  the  14th,  and  the  objection  of  his  officers  was 
not  on  account  of  the  condition  of  their  troops,  but  on  account  of 
the  strength  of  our  position.  Nothing  could  have  gratified  him 
and  his  officers  more,  than  for  us  to  have  surrendered  our  advan 
tage  and  taken  the  offensive.  General  Lee,  ever  ready  to  strike 
when  an  opportunity  offered,  knew  better  than  all  others  when 
it  was  best  to  attack  and  when  not  to  attack. 

It  is  a  notable  fact  about  all  those  people  who  favored  such 
blood-thirsty  and  desperate  measures,  that  they  were  never  in  the 
army,  to  share  the  dangers  into  which  they  were  so  anxious  to 
rush  others. 

About  the  close  of  the  winter  or  beginning  of  the  spring  of 
1863,  two  of  Longstreet's  divisions,  one  fourth  of  our  army,  Avere 
sent  to  the  South  side  of  James  River;  and,  during  their  absence, 
Hooker,  who  had  succeeded  Burnside  in  the  command,  commenced 
the  movement  which  resulted  in  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  in 
the  first  days  of  May.  Throwing  a  portion  of  his  troops  across 
the  river  just  below  Fredericksburg,  on  the  29th  of  April,  arid 
making  an  ostentatious  demonstration  with  three  corps  on  the 
North  bank,  he  proceeded  to  cross  four  others  above  our  left  flank 
to  Chancellorsville.  Having  accomplished  this,  Hooker  issued  a 
gasconading  order  to  his  troops,  in  which  he  claimed  to  have 
General  Lee's  army  in  his  power,  and  declared  his  purpose  of 
crushing  it.  Leaving  my  division,  one  brigade  of  another,  and  a 
portion  of  the  reserve  artillery,  in  all  less  than  nine  thousand  men, 
to  confront  the  three  corps  opposite  and  near  Fredericksburg, 
General  Lee  moved  with  five  divisions  of  infantry  and  a  portion 
of  the  artillery  to  meet  Hooker,  the  cavalry  being  employed  to 
watch  the  flanks.  As  soon  as  General  Lee  reached  Hooker's  front, 
he  determined  to  take  the  offensive,  and,  by  one  of  his  bold  stra 
tegic  movements,  he  sent  Jackson  around  Hooker's  right  flank, 
and  that  boastful  commander,  wrho  was  successively  reinforced  by 


29 


two  of  the  corps  left  opposite  Fredericksburg,  was  so  vigorously 
assailed,  that  he  was  put  on  the  defensive,  and  soon  compelled  to 
provide  for  the  safety  of  his  own  defeated  army. 

In  the  meantime,  Sedgwick,  whose  corps  numbered  about 
twenty-four  thousand  men,  and  who  had  a  division  of  another 
corps  with  him,  making  his  whole  force  about  thirty  thousand, 
had  crossed  the  river,  at  and  below  Fredericksburg,  with  the 
portion  of  his  troops  not  already  over,  and,  by  concentrating 
three  of  his  divisions  on  one  point  of  the  long  line,  of  five  or  six 
miles,  held  by  my  forces,  had,  on  the  3d  of  May,  after  repeated 
repulses,  broken  through,  immediately  in  rear  of  Fredericksburg, 
where  the  stonewall  wras  held  by  one  regiment  and  four  companies 
of  another,  the  whole  not  exceeding  five  hundred  men.  General 
Lee  was  preparing  to  renew  the  attack  on  Hooker,  whose  force 
at  Chancellorsville  had  been  driven  back  to  an  interior  line,  when 
he  was  informed  that  Sedgwick  was  moving  up  in  his  rear.  He 
"was  then  compelled  to  provide  against  this  new  danger,  and  he 
moved  troops  down  to  arrest  Sedgwick's  progress.  This  was  suc 
cessfully  done,  and  on  the  next  day,  (the  4th,)  three  of  the  bri 
gades  of  rny  division,  all  of  which  had  been  concentrated  and  had 
severed  Sedgwick's  connection  with  Fredericksburg  and  the  JSTorth 
bank,  fell  upon  his  left  flank,  and  drove  it  towards  the  river  in 
confusion,  while  the  other  troops  of  ours,  which  had  come  from 
above,  closed  in  on  him  and  forced  his  whole  command  into  the 
bend  of  the  river.  His  wrhole  command  would  now  have  been 
destroyed  or  captured,  but  night  came  on  and  arrested  our  pro 
gress.  During  the  night,  he  made  his  escape  over  a  bridge  which 
was  laid  down  for  him.  General  Lee  then  turned  his  attention 
again  to  Hooker,  but  he  also  made  his  escape,  the  next  night, 
under  the  cover  of  a  storm.  Thus  another  brilliant  victory  was 
achieved,  by  the  genius  and  boldness  of  our  commander,  against 
immense  odds. 

It  is  a  little  remarkable  that  Hooker  did  not  claim,  on  this 
occasion,  that  we  had  the  odds  against  him  ;  but  when  he  went 


30 


back,  under  compulsion,  he  issued  an  order,  in  which  he  stated, 
that  his  army  had  retired  for  reasons  best  known  to  itself,  that 
it  advanced  when  it  pleased,  fought  when  it  pleased,  and  retired 
when  it  pleased. 

In  his  testimony  before  the  committee  on  the  conduct  of  the 
war,  he  made  this  curious  statement : 

"  Our  artillery  had  always  been  superior  to  that  of  the  rebels, 
as  was  also  our  infantry,  except  in  discipline;  and  that,  for  reasons 
not  necessary  to  mention,  never  did  equal  Lee's  army.  With  a 
rank  and  file  vastly  inferior  to  our  own,  intellectually  and  physi 
cally,  that  army  has,  by  discipline  alone,  acquired  a  character  for 
steadiness  and  efficiency  unsurpassed,  in  my  judgment,  in  ancient 
or  modern  times.  We  have  not  been  able  to  rival  it,  nor  has 
there  been  any  near  approximation  to  it  in  the  other  rebel 
armies." 

This  was  the  impression  made  by  that  army  under  the  inspira 
tion  of  its  great  leader  on  "  fighting  Joe/'  as  he  was  called.  The 
impression  made  on  Lincoln,  at  that  time,  may  be  gathered  from  a 
telegram  sent  to  Butterfield,  Hooker's  chief-of-staif,  who  was  on 
the  North  of  the  river.  The  telegram  was  sent,  when  Hooker 
had  taken  refuge  in  his  new  works  in  rear  of  Chancellorsville, 
and  Sedgwick  was  cut  off  in  the  bend  of  the  river,  and  is  as 
follows,  in  full : 

"  Where  is  General  Hooker  ?  Where  is  Sedgwick  ?  Where  is 
Stoneman  ?  A.  LINCOLN." 

Hooker  had  with  him  what  was  left  of  the  army  of  Burnside, 
except  the  ninth  corps,  which  had  been  sent  off;  but  two  other 
corps,  the  eleventh  and  twelfth  had  been  added,  besides  recruits ; 
and  his  whole  force  was  largely  over  one  hundred  thousand  men. 
General  Lee's  army,  weakened  by  the  absence  of  Lougstreet's  two 
divisions,  was  very  little  if  any  over  fifty  thousand  men,  inclusive 
of  my  force  at  Fredericksburg. 

As  glorious  as  was  this  victory,  it,  nevertheless,  shed  a  gloom 
over  the  whole  army  and  country,  for  in  it  had  fallen  the  great 


31 


Lieutenant  to  whom  General  Lee  had  always  entrusted  the  execu 
tion  of  his  most  daring  plans,  and  who  had  proved  himself  so 
worthy  of  the  confidence  reposed  in  him.  It  is  not  necessary  for 
me  to  stop  here,  to  delineate  the  character  and  talents  of  General 
Jackson.  As  long  as  unselfish  patriotism,  Christian  devotion  and 
purity  of  character,  and  deeds  of  heroism  shall  command  the  admi 
ration  of  men,  Stonewall  Jackson's  name  and  fame  will  be  rever 
enced.  Of  all  who  mourned  his  death,  none  felt  more  acutely  the 
loss  the  country  and  the  army  had  sustained  than  General  Lee. 
General  Jackson  had  always  appreciated,  and  sympathized  with 
the  bold  conceptions  of  the  commanding  General,  and  entered 
upon  their  execution  with  the  most  cheerful  alacrity  and  zeal. 
General  Lee  never  found  it  necessary  to  accompany  him,  to  see 
that  his  plans  were  carried  out,  but  could  always  trust  him  alone; 
and  well  might  he  say,  when  Jackson  fell,  that  he  himself  had  lost 
his  "  right  arm." 

After  General  Jackson's  death,  the  army  was  divided  into  three 
corps  of  three  divisions  each,  instead  of  two  corps  of  four  divi 
sions  each,  the  ninth  division  being  formed  by  taking  two  brigades 
from  the  division  of  A.  P.  Hill  and  uniting  them  with  two  others 
which  were  brought  from  the  South.  These  two  brigades  consti 
tuted  all  the  reinforcements  to  our  army,  after  the  battle  of  Chan- 
cellorsville,  and  previous  to  the  campaign  into  Pennsylvania. 
Longstreet's  two  absent  divisions  were  now  brought  back  and 
moved  up  towards  Culpeper  C.  II.,  and  General  Lee  entered  on  a 
campaign  of  even  greater  boldness  than  that  of  the  previous  year. 

While  Hooker's  army  yet  occupied  the  Stafford  heights,  our 
army  was  put  in  motion  for  Pennsylvania,  on  the  4th  of  June, 
Hill's  corps  being  left  for  a  while  to  watch  Hooker.  This  move 
ment  was  undertaken  because  the  interposition  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  between  the  two  armies,  presented  an  insurmountable  ob 
stacle  to  offensive  operations  on  our  part,  against  the  enemy  in 
the  position  he  then  occupied,  and  General  Lee  was  determined 
not  to  stand  on  the  defensive,  and  give  the  enemy  time  to  mature 


32 


his  plans  and  accumulate  a  larger  army  for  another  attack  on 
him. 

The  enemy  was  utterly  bewildered  by  this  new  movement,  and 
while  he  was  endeavoring  to  find  out  what  it  meant,  the  advance 
of  our  army,  E well's  corps,  composed  of  three  of  Jackson's  old 
divisions,  entered  the  Valley  and  captured,  at  Winchester  and 
Martinsburg,  about  four  thousand  prisoners,  twenty-nine  pieces  of 
artillery,  about  four  thousand  stand  of  small  arms,  a  large  wagon 
train,  and  many  stores.  It  then  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  one 
division  went  to  Carlisle,  while  another  went  to  the  banks  of  the 
Susquehanna,  through  York.  The  two  other  corps  soon  followed, 
and  this  movement  brought  the  whole  of  Hooker's  army  across 
the  Potomac  in  pursuit.  The  two  armies  concentrated,  and  en 
countered  each  other  at  Gettysburg,  east  of  the  South  Mountain, 
in  a  battle  extending  through  three  days,  from  the  1st  to  the  3d 
of  July,  inclusive.  On  the  first  day,  a  portion  of  our  army,  com 
posed  of  two  divisions  of  Hill's  corps  and  two  divisions  of  Ewell's 
corps,  gained  a  very  decided  victory  over  two  of  the  enemy's  corps, 
which  latter  were  driven  back,  in  great  confusion,  through  Gettys 
burg,  to  the  Heights,  immediately  South  and  East  of  the  town, 
known  as  Cemetery  Hill.  On  the  second  and  third  days,  we 
assaulted  the  enemy's  position  at  different  points,  but  failed  to 
dislodge  his  army,  now  under  Meade,  from  its  very  strong  posi 
tion  on  Cemetery  and  the  adjacent  hills.  Both  sides  suffered  very 
heavy  losses,  that  of  the  enemy  exceeding  ours. 

Our  ammunition  had  drawn  short,  and  we  were  beyond  the 
reach  of  any  supplies  of  that  kind.  General  Lee  therefore  desisted 
from  his  efforts  to  carry  the  position,  and,  after  straightening  his 
line,  he  confronted  Meade  for  a  whole  day,  without  the  latter  dar 
ing  to  move  from  his  position,  and  then  retired  towards  the  Poto 
mac,  for  the  purpose  of  being  within  reach  of  supplies.  We  halted 
near  Hagerstown,  Maryland,  and  when  Meade,  who  had  followed 
us  very  cautiously,  arrived,  battle  was  offered  him,  but  he  went  to 
fortifying  in  our  front.  We  confronted  him  for  several  days,  but 


33 


as  he  did  not  venture  to  attack  us,  and  heavy  rains  had  set  in,  we 
retired  across  the  Potomac  to  avoid  having  an  impassable  river  in 
our  rear. 

The  campaign  into  Pennsylvania,  and  the  battle  of  Gettysburg, 
have  been  much  criticized,  and  but  little  understood.     The  mag 
nanimity  of  General  Lee  caused  him  to  withhold  from  the  public 
the  true  causes  of  the  failure  to  gain  a  decisive  victory  at  Gettys 
burg.     Many  writers  have  racked  their  brains  to  account  for  that 
failure.     Some  have  attributed  it  to  the  fact  that  the  advantage 
gained  on  the  first  day  was  not  pressed  immediately ;  and  among 
them  is  a  Northern  historian  of  the  war,  (Swinton,)  who  says : 
"  Ewell  was  even  advancing  a  line  against  Gulp's  Hill  when  Lee 
reached  the  field  and  stayed  the  movement."     There  is  no  founda 
tion  for  this  statement.    When  General  Lee,  after  the  engagement, 
reached  the  part  of  the  field  where  E well's  command  had  fought, 
it  was  near  dark,  and  no  forward  movement  was  in  progress  or 
contemplated.      Two   fresh   corps   of  the   enemy,   Slocum's   and 
Sickels',  had  arrived  at  5  o'clock,  at  least  two  hours  before  Gen 
eral  Lee  came  to  us  after  the  engagement.     There  was  a  time,  as 
we  know  now,  immediately  after  the  enemy  was  driven  back, 
when,  if  we  had  advanced  vigorously,  the  heights  of  Gettysburg 
would  probably  have  been  taken,  but  that  was  not  then  apparent. 
I  was  in  favor  of  the  advance,  but  I  think  it  doubtful  whether  it 
wonld  have  resulted  in  any  greater  advantage  than  to  throw  back 
the  two  routed  corps  on  the  main  body  of  their  army,  and  cause 
the  great  battle  to  be  fought  on  other  ground.    Meade  had  already 
selected  another  position,  on  Pipe  Clay  creek,  where  he  would 
have  concentrated  his  army,  and  we  would  have  been  compelled 
to  give  him  battle  or  retire.     Moreover,  it  is  not  impossible  that 
the  arrival  of  the  two  fresh  corps  may  have  turned  the  fate  of  the 
day  against  the  troops  we  then  had  on  the  field,  had  we  pressed 
our  advantage.     General  Lee  had  ordered  the  concentration  of  his 
army  at  Cashtown,  and  the  battle  on  this  day,  brought  on  by  the 
advance  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  was  unexpected  to  him.     When 
3 


34 


he  ascertained  the  advantage  that  had  been  gained,  he  determined 
to  press  it  as  soon  as  the  remainder  of  his  army  arrived.  In  a 
conference  with  General.  Ewell,  General  Rodes  and  myself,  when 
he  did  reach  us,  after  the  enemy  had  been  routed,  he  expressed  his 
determination  to  assault  the  enemy's  position  at  daylight  on  the 
next  morning,  and  wished  to  know  whether  we  could  make  the 
attack  from  our  flank — the  left — at  the  designated  time.  We  in 
formed  him  of  the  fact  that  the  ground  immediately  in  our  front, 
leading  to  the  enemy's  position,  furnished  much  greater  obstacles 
to  a  successful  assault  than  existed  at  any  other  point,  and  we  con 
curred  in  suggesting  to  him  that,  as  our  corps  (Ewell's)  constituted 
the  only  troops  then  immediately  confronting  the  enemy,  he  would 
manifestly  concentrate  and  fortify  against  us,  during  the  night,  as 
proved  to  be  the  case,  according  to  subsequent  information.  He 
then  determined  to  make  the  attack  from  our  right  on  the  enemy's 
left,  and  left  us  for  the  purpose  of  ordering  up  Longstreet's  corps 
in  time  to  begin  the  attack  at  dawn  next  morning.  That  corps 
was  not  in  readiness  to  make  the  attack  until  four  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  next  day.  By  that  time,  Meade's  whole  army 
had  arrived  on  the  field  and  taken  its  position.  Had  the  attack 
been  made  at  daylight,  as  contemplated,  it  must  have  resulted  in  a 
brilliant  and  decisive  victory,  as  all  of  Meade's  army  had  not  then 
arrived,  and  a  very  small  portion  of  it  was  in  position.  A  con 
siderable  portion  of  his  army  did  not  get  up  until  after  sun-rise, 
one  corps  not  arriving  until  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  a 
prompt  advance  to  the  attack  must  have  resulted  in  his  defeat  in 
detail.  The  position  which  Longstreet  attacked  at  four,  was  not 
occupied  by  the  enemy  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  and  Round  Top 
Hill,  which  commanded  the  enemy's  position,  could  have  been 
taken  in  the  morning  without  a  struggle.  The  attack  was  made 
by  two  divisions,  and  though  the  usual  gallantry  was  displayed  by 
the  troops  engaged  in  it,  no  very  material  advantage  was  gained. 
When  General  Lee  saw  his  plans  thwarted  by  the  delay  on  our 
right,  he  ordered  an  attack  to  be  made  also  from  our  left,  to  be 


35 


begun  by  Johnson's  division  on  Gulp's  Hill,  and  followed  up  by 
the  rest  of  Ewell's  corps,  and  also  by  Hill's.  This  attack  was 
begun  with  great  vigor  by  Johnson,  and  two  of  my  brigades,  im 
mediately  on  his  right,  which  were  the  only  portion  of  the  divi 
sion  then  available,  as  the  other  two  brigades  had  been  sent  off  to 
the  left  to  watch  the  York  road,  moved  forward  promptly,  climbed 
the  heights  on  the  left  of  Gettysburg,  over  stone  and  plank  fences, 
reached  the  summit  of  Cemetery  Hill,  and  got  possession  of  the 
enemy's  works  and  his  batteries  there  posted.  One  of  my  other 
brigades  had  been  sent  for,  and  got  back  in  time  to  be  ready  to 
act  as  a  support  to  those  in  front :  but  though  Johnson  was  mak 
ing  good  progress  in  his  attack,  there  was  no  movement  on  my 
right,  and  the  enemy,  not  being  pressed  in  that  direction,  concen 
trated  on  my  two  brigades  in  such  overwhelming  force  as  to  ren 
der  it  necessary  for  them  to  retire.  Thus,  after  having  victory  in 
their  grasp,  they  were  compelled  to  relinquish  it,  because  General 
Lee's  orders  had  again  failed  to  be  carried  out;  but  one  of  those 
brigades  brought  oft'  four  captured  battle  flags  from  the  top  of 
Cemetery  Hill.  This  affair  occurred  just  a  little  before  dark. 

On  the  next  day,  when  the  assault  was  made  by  Picket's  divi 
sion  in  such  gallant  style,  there  was  again  a  miscarriage,  in  not 
properly  supporting  it,  according  to  the  plan  and  orders  of  the 
commanding  General.  You  must  recollect  that  a  commanding 
General  cannot  do  the  actual  marching  and  fighting  of  his  army. 
These  must,  necessarily,  be  entrusted  to  his  subordinates,  and  any 
hesitation,  delay  or  miscarriage  in  the  execution  of  his  orders,  may 
defeat  the  best  devised  schemes.  Contending  against  such  odds  as 
we  did,  it  was  necessary,  always,  that  there  should  be  the  utmost 
dispatch,  energy  and  undoubting  confidence  in  carrying  out  the 
plans  of  the  commanding  General.  A  subordinate  who  under 
takes  to  doubt  the  wisdom  of  his  superior's  plans,  and  enters  upon 
their  execution  with  reluctance  and  doubt,  will  not  be  likely  to 
ensure  success.  It  was  General  Jackson's  unhesitating  confidence 
and  faith  in  the  chances  of  success,  that  caused  it  so  often  to  perch 


36 


on  his  banners,  and  made  him  such  an  invaluable  executor  of  Gen 
eral  Lee's  plans.  If  Mr.  Swinton  has  told  the  truth,  in  repeating 
in  his  book  what  is  alleged  to  have  been  said  to  him  by  General 
Longstreet,  there  was  at  least  one  of  General  Lee's  corps  com 
manders  at  Gettysburg  who  did  not  enter  upon  the  execution  of 
his  plans  with  that  confidence  and  faith  necessary  to  success,  and 
hence,  perhaps,  it  was  that  it  was  not  achieved.  Some  have 
thought  that  General  Lee  did  wrong  in  fighting  at  Gettysburg, 
and  it  has  been  said  that  he  ought  to  have  moved  around  Meade's 
left,  so  as  to  get  between  him  and  Washington.  It  is  a  very  easy 
matter  to  criticize  and  prophecy  after  events  happen ;  but  it  would 
have  been  manifestly  a  most  dangerous  movement  for  him  to  have 
undertaken  to  pass  Meade  by  the  flank  with  all  his  trains.  In 
passing  through  the  narrow  space  between  Gettysburg  and  the 
South  Mountain,  we  would  have  been  exposed  to  an  attack  under 
very  disadvantageous  circumstances.  I  then  thought,  and  still 
think,  that  it  was  right  to  fight  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  and  I 
am  firmly  convinced  that  if  General  Lee's  plans  had  been  carried 
out  in  the  spirit  in  which  they  were  conceived,  a  decisive  victory 
would  have  been  obtained,  which  perhaps  would  have  secured  our 
independence.  Our  army  was  never  in  better  heart,  and  when  it 
did  retire,  it  was  with  no  sense  of  defeat.  My  division  brought 
up  the  rear  of  the  army,  and  it  did  not  leave  the  sight  of  the 
enemy's  position  until  the  afternoon  of  the  5th.  One  of  Meade's 
corps  followed  us  most  cautiously,  at  a  respectable  distance,  and 
when,  at  Fairfield,  near  the  foot  of  the  Mountain,  I  formed  line 
of  battle  to  await  it,  no  advance  was  made.  There  were  none  of 
the  indications  of  defeat  in  the  rear  of  the  army  on  the  march,  and 
when  we  took  position  near  Hagerstown  to  await  Meade's  attack, 
it  was  with  entire  confidence  in  our  ability  to  meet  it  with  success. 
Meade's  army  at  Gettysburg  numbered  at  least  one  hundred 
thousand  men  in  position.  The  whole  force  in  the  department  of 
Northern  Virginia,  at  the  close  of  May,  four  days  before  our 
movement  North  began,  was  sixty-eight  thousand  three  hundred 


37 


and  fifty-two.  No  reinforcements  were  received  after  that  time, 
and,  of  course,  the  whole  force  was  not  carried  out  of  Virginia. 
General  Lee's  army  at  Gettysburg  numbered  considerably  less 
than  sixty  thousand  men  of  all  arms. 

This  campaign  did  not  accomplish  all  that  we  desired,  but, 
nevertheless,  it  was  not  unattended  with  great  and  advantageous 
results.  It  certainly  had  the  effect  of  deferring,  for  one  year  at 
least,  the  advance  on  the  Confederate  Capital,  and  had  it  not 
been  for  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  at  the  same  time,  and  the  conse 
quent  severance  of  all  the  States  beyond  the  Mississippi  from  the 
Confederacy,  for  all  practical  purposes,  the  public  would  not 
have  taken  as  gloomy  a  view  of  the  results  of  the  campaign  as 
it  did. 

So  far  from  our  army  being  defeated  or  broken  in  spirit,  when 
the  invading  army  of  the  enemy  again  advanced  into  Virginia, 
Gen.  Lee  intercepted  it,  and  taking  position  on  the  South  bank  of 
the  Rapidan,  effectually  prevented  any  further  advance  until  May, 
1864,  when,  as  I  will  show  you,  the  power  of  the  Confederacy 
had  been  so  crippled  in  other  quarters,  as  to  allow  an  unusual 
accumulation  of  men  and  resources  against  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia. 

You  must  understand  that  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock  and 
the  Rapidan  was  the  only  practicable  line  of  defence  in  Northern 
Virginia,  because  the  possession  and  control  of  the  Potomac  and 
Chesapeake  Bay,  which  the  enemy's  monitors  and  iron-clads  gave 
him,  without  let  or  hindrance,  would  enable  him  to  flank  and  turn 
any  line  of  defence  which  might  be  assumed  North  of  those  rivers. 
Beyond  that  line  General  Lee,  in  1862,  had  driven  the  invading 
army,  and  there  he  had  retained  it  up  to  the  time  of  which  I  am 
speaking.  This  was  all  that  a  defensive  policy  could  accomplish, 
and  it  was  only  when  he  assumed  the  offensive,  as  in  the  cam 
paigns  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  that  the  enemy  could  be 
hurled  back  on  his  own  border,  in  order  to  defend  his  territory 
and  Capital.  The  results  of  the  campaign  into  Pennsylvania  left 


38 


General  Lee  in  possession  of  his  legitimate  line  of  defence,  with 
the  enemy's  plans  all  thwarted  for  that  year.  In  fact  so  satisfied 
was  the  latter  of  his  inability  to  accomplish  anything,  by  an 
attempt  to  advance  on  Richmond,  that  two  of  Meade's  corps  were 
detached  for  the  purpose  of  reinforcing  Rosecrans  at  Chattanooga, 
and  General  Lee  held  his  own  line  by  such  a  certain  tenure,  that 
he  was  able  to  detach  Longstreet's  corps,  and  send  two  divisions  to 
Bragg,  and  one,  first  to  the  South  side  of  James  river,  and  then  to 
North  Carolina.  After  Longstreet  had  gone,  occurred  the  move 
ment  which  caused  Meade  to  retire  to  Centreville,  and  about  the 
last  of  November  he  crossed  the  Rapidan  and  moved  to  Mine  run, 
but  retired  just  in  time  to  avoid  an  attack  which  General  Lee  had 
prepared  to  make  on  his  flank. 

At  the  close  of  the  year  1863,  the  enemy  was  no  farther 
advanced  in  his  oft  repeated  effort  to  capture  the  Confederate 
Capital,  than  when  Manassas  was  evacuated,  early  in  the  spring 
of  1862;  but  in  the  Southwest,  the  fall  of  Yicksburg,  the  disaster 
at  Missionary  Ridge,  and  the  failure  of  the  campaign  in  Eastern 
Tennessee,  had  not  only  severed  the  trans-Mississippi  region  from 
the  remainder  of  the  Confederacy,  but  had  left  all  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  firmly  in  the  power  of  the  enemy,  and  rendered  all  the 
lower  basin  of  the  Mississippi  practically  useless  to  us.  The  main 
army  of  the  West  had  been  compelled  to  retire  to  Dalton  in  the 
Northwestern  corner  of  Georgia,  and,  for  all  useful  purposes,  the 
Confederacy  was  confined  to  Georgia,  North  and  South  Carolina, 
and  the  portion  of  Virginia  held  by  us.  It  is  true  that  we  held 
posts  and  had  troops  in  Alabama,  Florida  and  Mississippi,  but 
they  could  contribute  nothing  to  the  general  defence,  and  the 
resources  of  those  States  were  substantially  lost  to  us,  at  least  so 
far  as  operations  in  Virginia  were  concerned.  This  state  of  things 
left  the  enemy  at  liberty  to  concentrate  his  resources  against  the 
two  principal  armies  of  the  Confederacy.  Grant  was  made  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  of  all  the  armies  of  the  enemy  in  the  spring  of 
1864,  and  took  his  position  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the 


39 


field,  while  Sherman  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  army  at 
Chattanooga,  which  was  to  operate  against  ours  at  Dalton. 

By  the  1st  of  May,  Grant  had  accumulated  an  army  of  more 
than  one  hundred  and  forty-one  thousand  men  on  the  North  of 
the  Rapidan ;  and  General  Lee's  army  on  the  South  bank,  in 
cluding  two  of  Longstreet's  divisions,  which  had  returned  from 
Tennessee,  was  under  fifty  thousand  men,  of  all  arms. 

Grant's  theory  was  to  accumulate  the  largest  numbers  practica 
ble  against  us,  so  as,  by  constant  "hammering,"  to  destroy  our 
army  "  by  mere  attrition  if  in  no  other  way."  Besides  the  army 
under  Grant,  in  Culpeper,  there  were  near  fifty  thousand  men  in 
Washington  and  Baltimore,  and  the  military  control  of  the  rail 
roads  and  the  telegraph,  as  well  as  an  immense  number  of  steam 
transports,  rendered  it  an  easy  matter  to  reinforce  him  indefinitely. 

On  the  4th  of  May,  he  crossed  the  Rapidan  on  our  right  to  the 
Wilderness,  to  get  between  us  and  Richmond.  General  Lee  ad 
vanced  promptly  to  attack  him  and  thwart  his  purpose;  and  then 
ensued  that  most  wonderful  campaign  from  the  Rapidan  to  the 
James,  in  which  the  ever  glorious  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
grappled  its  gigantic  antagonist  in  a  death  struggle,  which  con 
tinued  until  the  latter  was  thrown  off,  crippled  and  bleeding,  to 
the  cover  of  the  James  and  Appornattox  rivers,  where  it  was 
enabled  to  recruit  and  renew  its  strength  for  another  effort. 

Two  days  of  fierce  battle  were  had  in  the  Wilderness,  and  our 
little  army  never  struck  more  rapid  and  vigorous  blows.  Grant 
was  compelled  to  move  off  from  our  front,  and  attempt  to  accom 
plish  his  purpose  by  another  flank  movement,  but  General  Lee 
promptly  intercepted  him  at  Spotsylvania  Court  House  ;  where 
again  occurred  a  series  of  desperate  engagements,  in  which,  though 
a  portion  of  our  line  was  temporarily  broken,  and  we  sustained  a 
loss  which  we  could  ill  afford,  yet  Grant's  army  was  so  crippled, 
that  it  was  unable  to  resume  the  offensive,  until  it  had  been  rein 
forced  from  Washington  and  Baltimore,  to  the  full  extent  of  forty 
thousand  men.  But  General  Lee  received  no  reinforcements,  and 


40 


yet  Grant,  after  waiting  six  days  for  his,  when  they  did  arrive, 
was  again  compelled  to  move  off  from  us,  and  attempt  another 
flank  movement,  under  cover  of  the  net  work  of  difficult  water 
courses  around  and  east  of  Spotsylvania  Court  House.  Never 
had  the  wonderful  powers  of  our  great  Chief,  and  the  unflinching 
courage  of  his  small  army,  been  more  conspicuously  displayed  than 
during  the  thirteen  trying  days  at  this  place.  One  of  his  three 
corps  commanders  had  been  disabled  by  wounds  at  the  Wilder 
ness,  and  another  was  too  sick  to  command  his  corps,  while  he 
himself  was  suffering  from  a  most  annoying  and  weakening 
disease.  In  fact,  nothing  but  his  own  determined  will  enabled 
him  to  keep  the  field  at  all ;  and  it  was  there  rendered  more 
manifest  than  ever,  that  he  was  the  head  and  front,  the  very  life 
and  soul  of  his  army.  Grant's  new  movement  was  again  inter 
cepted  at  Hanover  Junction,  and  from  that  point  he  was  com 
pelled  to  retire  behind  the  North  Anna  and  Pamunkey,  to  escape 
his  tenacious  adversary  by  another  maneuvre.  He  was  again 
intercepted  at  Pole  Green  Church ;  and  at  Bethesda  Church,  and 
on  the  historic  field  of  Cold  Harbor,  occurred  another  series  of 
most  bloody  battles,  in  which  such  carnage  was  inflicted  on  Grant's 
army,  that  when  orders  were  given  for  a  new  assault,  his  troops 
in  sullen  silence  declined  to  move ;  and  he  was  compelled  to  ask 
for  a  truce  to  bury  his  dead.  Though  largely  reinforced  from 
Butler's  army,  Grant  was  now  compelled  to  take  refuge  on  the 
South  side  of  James  River,  at  a  point  to  which  he  could  have  gone, 
by  water,  from  his  camps  in  Culpeper,  without  the  loss  of  a  man. 
His  original  plan  of  the  campaign  was  thus  completely  thwarted, 
and  he  was  compelled  to  abandon  the  attempt  to  take  Richmond 
by  the  land  route,  after  a  loss  in  battle  of  more  men  than  were  in 
General  Lee's  whole  army,  including  the  reinforcements  received 
at  Hanover  Junction  and  Cold  Harbor,  which  latter  consisted  of 
two  divisions,  a  brigade,  and  less  than  three  thousand  men  under 
Breckenridge,  from  the  Valley.  When  we  consider  the  disparity 
of  the  forces  engaged  in  this  campaign,  the  advantages  of  the 


41 


enemy  for  reinforcing  his  army,  the  time  consumed  in  actual  bat 
tle,  it  must  rank  as  the  most  remarkable  campaign  of  ancient  or 
modern  times.  We  may  read  of  great  victories,  settling  the  fate 
of  nations,  gained  by  small  armies  of  compact,  well-trained  and 
thoroughly  disciplined  troops,  over  immense  and  unwieldy  hordes 
of  untrained  barbarians,  or  of  demoralized  soldiers,  sunk  in  effem 
inacy  and  luxury ;  but  where  shall  we  find  the  history  of  such  a 
prolonged  struggle,  in  which  such  enormous  advantages  of  num 
bers,  equipment,  resources  and  supplies,  were  on  the  side  of  the 
defeated  party.  The  proximity  of  a  number  of  water  courses, 
navigable  for  steam  vessels  and  patrolled  by  Federal  gunboats, 
had  enabled  Grant  to  keep  open  his  communications  with  the 
sources  of  his  supplies,  and  to  receive  constant  accessions  of  troops, 
so  that  it  was  impossible  to  destroy  his  army ;  but  if  the  contest, 
as  in  most  campaigns  of  former  times,  had  been  confined  to  the 
two  armies,  originally  engaged  in  it,  there  can  be  no  question  but 
that  Grant's  would  have  been,  in  effect,  destroyed.  As  it  was,  his 
whole  movement,  after  the  first  encounter  in  the  Wilderness,  was 
but  a  retreat  by  the  flank,  the  Potomac,  the  Rappahannock,  the 
York  and  Pamunkey,  and  the  James,  in  succession,  furnishing  him 
a  new  base  to  retire  on,  for  the  receipt  of  supplies  and  reinforce 
ments,  and  the  resumption  of  operations.  The  boldness  and  fertility 
of  the  strategy  employed  by  our  glorious  Chieftain,  during  this 
campaign,  wras  indeed  marvellous ;  and  such  was  the  disparity  of 
numbers  that  it  appears  like  romance,  and  men  are  disposed  to 
turn  an  incredulous  ear  when  the  truth  is  told.  In  fact,  General 
Lee,  himself,  was  aware  of  the  apparent  improbability,  which  a 
true  statement  of  the  facts  would  present,  and  in  a  letter  to  me, 
during  the  winter  of  1865-6,  he  said  : 

"  It  will  be  difficult  to  get  the  world  to  understand  the  odds 
against  which  we  fought." 

Notwithstanding  the  disparity  which  existed,  he  was  anxious, 
as  I  know,  to  avail  himself  of  every  opportunity  to  strike  an 
offensive  blow7;  and  just  as  Grant  was  preparing  to  move  across 


42 


James  River  with  his  defeated  and  dispirited  army,  General  Lee 
was  maturing  his  plans  for  taking  the  offensive ;  and,  in  stating 
his  desire  for  me  to  take  the  initiative  with  the  corps  I  then 
commanded,  he  said : 

"  We  must  destroy  this  army  of  Grant's  before  he  gets  to  James 
River,  if  he  gets  there,  it  will  become  a  siege,  and  then  it  will  be 
a  mere  question  of  time." 

He  knew  well  that,  with  the  army  Grant  then  had,  he  could 
not  take  Richmond,  but  he  also  knew  that,  if  that  army  could  be 
placed  on  the  South  of  the  James  and  East  of  the  Appomattox, 
where  it  would  be  out  of  the  reach  of  ours  for  offensive  operations, 
it  could  be  reinforced  indefinitely,  until  by  the  process  of  attrition, 
the  exhaustion  of  our  resources,  and  the  employment  of  mechanism 
and  the  improved  engines  of  war  against  them,  the  brave  defenders 
of  our  cause  would  gradually  melt  away.  In  fact,  he  knew  that 
it  would  then  become  a  contest  between  mechanical  power  and 
physical  strength,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  gradually  diminishing 
nerve  and  sinew  of  Confederate  soldiers,  on  the  other,  until  the 
unlimited  resources  of  our  enemies  must  finally  prevail  over  all 
the  genius  and  chivalric  daring,  which  had  so  long  baffled  their 
mighty  efforts  in  the  field.  It  was  from  such  considerations  as 
these,  that  he  had  made  his  great  and  successful  effort  to  raise  the 
siege  in  1862;  his  subsequent  campaign  into  Maryland;  and  his 
campaign  into  Pennsylvania  in  1863. 

Before  the  contemplated  blow  against  Grant  was  struck,  the 
startling  intelligence  of  Hunter's  operations  in  the  Valley  was 
received,  and  it  became  necessary  to  detach,  first  Breckenridge's 
command,  and  then  my  corps  to  meet  the  new  danger  threaten 
ing  all  of  our  communications. 

This  enabled  Grant  to  reach  his  new  position  unmolested,  the 
movement  towards  which  began  on  the  night  I  received  my  orders 
to  move  by  3  o'clock  next  morning  for  the  Valley.  Finding  it 
necessary  to  detach  my  command  on  a  work  of  pressing  urgency, 
General  Lee  determined  to  combine  with  the  movement,  a  daring 


43 


expedition  across  the  Potomac,  to  threaten  the  enemy's  country 
and  capital;  about  the  conduct  and  results  of  which,  I  will  merely 
say,  that  there  has  been  much  misunderstanding  and  ignorant  mis 
representation.  After  reaching  the  South  bank  of  the  James, 
Grant  made  a  dash  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  Petersburg, 
which  was  thwarted  by  the  good  soldier  who  had  already  baffled 
and  defeated  Butler.  The  enemy,  now  having  found  it  impossible 
to  capture  the  Confederate  Capital  in  a  campaign  by  land,  resorted 
to  a  combined  operation  of  his  army  and  navy,  by  the  way  of  the 
James.  The  condition  of  things  in  the  South  and  Southwest  ena 
bled  him  to  still  further  strengthen  Grant's  army  after  its  junction 
with  Butler's ;  and  the  fall  of  Atlanta,  in  September,  severed  the 
greater  part  of  Georgia  practically  from  the  Confederacy.  There 
were  no  means  of  recruiting  General  Lee's  army,  to  any  considera 
ble  extent,  after  its  union  with  Beauregard's  small  force,  which, 
with  the  division  and  brigade  of  the  army  of  Northern  Virginia 
returned  at  Hanover  Junction,  and  the  division  received  at  Cold 
Harbor,  did  not  reach  twenty  thousand  men,  while  my  corps  had 
been  detached.  For  nine  long  months  was  the  unequal  contest 
protracted  by  the  genius  of  one  man,  aided  by  the  valor  of  his 
little  force,  occupying  a  line  of  more  than  thirty  miles,  with 
scarcely  more  than  a  respectable  skirmish  line.  During  this  time, 
there  were  many  daring  achievements  and  heroic  deeds  performed 
by  the  constantly  diminishing  survivors  of  those  who  had  ren 
dered  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  so  illustrious ;  but,  finally, 
constant  attrition  and  lingering  starvation  did  their  work.  Gene 
ral  Lee  had  been  unable  to  attack  Grant  in  his  stronghold,  South 
of  the  James  and  East  of  the  Appomattox,  where  alone  such  a 
movement  was  practicable,  because  a  concentration  for  that  pur 
pose,  on  the  East  of  the  latter  river,  would  have  left  the  way  to 
Richmond  open  to  the  enemy.  When,  by  the  unsuccessful  expe 
dition  into  Tennessee,  the  march  of  Sherman  through  the  centre  of 
Georgia  to  the  Atlantic,  his  subsequent  expedition  North  through 
South  Carolina  into  North  Carolina,  and  the  consequent  fall  of 


44 


Charleston  and  Wilmington,  the  Confederacy  had  been  practically 
reduced  to  Richmond  city,  the  remnant  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  and  the  very  narrow  slips  of  country  bordering  on  the 
three  railroads  and  the  canal  running  out  of  that  city  into  the 
Valley,  Southwestern  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  the  struggle 
in  Virginia,  maintained  so  long  by  the  consummate  ability  of  our 
leader,  began  to  draw  to  a  close.  To  add  to  his  embarrassments, 
he  had  been  compelled  to  detach  a  large  portion  of  his  cavalry  to 
the  aid  of  the  troops  falling  back  before  Sherman  in  his  march 
Northward,  and  a  portion  of  his  infantry  to  the  defence  of  Wil 
mington ;  and,  at  the  close  of  March,  1865,  Sherman  had  ap 
proached  as  far  North  as  Goldsborough,  North  Carolina,  on  his 
movement  to  unite  with  Grant. 

It  was  not  till  then  that  Grant,  to  whose  aid  an  immense  force 
of  superbly  equipped  cavalry  had  swept  down  from  the  Valley, 
was  able  to  turn  General  Lee's  flank  and  break  his  attenuated  line. 
The  retreat  from  the  lines  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg  began  in 
the  early  days  of  April,  and  the  remnant  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  fell  back  for  more  than  one  hundred  miles,  before  its 
overpowering  antagonist,  repeatedly  presenting  front  to  the  latter, 
and  giving  battle  so  as  to  check  its  progress.  Finally,  from  mere 
exhaustion,  less  than  eight  thousand  men,  with  arms  in  their 
hands,  of  the  noblest  army  that  had  ever  fought,  "  in  all  the  tide 
of  time,"  were  surrendered  at  Appamattox  to  an  army  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  and  the  sword  of  Robert  E.  Lee, 
without  a  blemish  on  it,  was  sheathed  forever;  and  the  flag,  to 
which  he  had  added  such  lustre,  was  furled,  to  be  henceforth  em 
balmed  in  the  affectionate  remembrance  of  those  who  had  remained 
faithful  during  all  our  trials,  and  will  do  so  to  the  end. 

Who  is  it  that  stands  out  the  grandest  figure  in  that  last  sad 
scene  of  the  drama  ?  Is  it  the  victor  ?  Victor  over  what  ?  Can 
it  be  possible  that  any  adherent  of  the  cause  of  our  enemies,  can 
recur  to  that  scene  at  Appomattox  Court  House  without  blushing  ? 
On  that  occasion,  the  vast  superiority  of  the  Confederate  Com- 


45 


mander  over  his  antagonist,  in  all  the  qualities  of  a  great  Captain, 
and  of  the  Confederate  soldier  over  the  Northern,  were  made  most 
manifest  to  the  dullest  comprehension,  and  none  were  made  more 
sensible  of  it  than  our  adversaries.  General  Lee  had  not  been 
conquered  in  battle,  but  surrendered  because  he  had  no  longer  an 
army  with  which  to  give  battle.  What  he  surrendered  was  the 
skeleton,  the  mere  ghost  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  which 
had  been  gradually  worn  down  by  the  combined  agencies  of  num 
bers,  steam-power,  railroads,  mechanism,  and  all  the  resources  of 
physical  science.  It  had,  in  fact,  been  engaged  in  a  struggle,  not 
only  against  the  mere  brute  power  of  man,  but  against  all  the  ele 
ments  of  fire,  air,  earth  and  water ;  and  even  that  all-pervading 
and  subtle  fluid,  whose  visible  demonstrations  the  ancients  desig 
nated  "  The  thunderbolt  of  the  gods,"  had  been  led  submissive  in 
the  path  of  the  opposing  army,  so  as  to  concentrate  with  rapidity 
and  make  available  all  the  other  agencies. 

It  was  by  the  use  of  these  new  adjuncts  to  the  science  of  war, 
that  McClellan  and  Pope  had  escaped  destruction  in  1862;  the 
Federal  Capital  been  saved,  after  the  terrible  chastisement  in 
flicted  on  their  armies ;  Pennsylvania  also  saved  in  1863,  and  Meade 
enabled  to  fight  a  drawn  battle  at  Gettysburg ;  Grant's  army  pre 
served  from  annihilation  in  1864,  and  enabled  to  reach  the  welcome 
shelter  of  the  James  and  Appomattox ;  and  now,  they  had  finally 
produced  that  exhaustion  of  our  army  and  resources,  and  that 
accumulation  of  numbers  on  the  other  side,  which  wrought  the 
final  disaster. 

When  we  come  to  estimate  General  Lee's  achievements  and 
abilities  as  a  military  commander,  all  these  things  must  be  taken 
into  consideration. 

I  have  now  given  you  a  condensed  sketch  of  General  Lee's  mili 
tary  career,  and  I  am  aware  that  what  I  have  said  falls  short  of 
the  real  merits  of  the  subject.  My  estimates  of  the  enemy's 
strength  are  taken  from  their  own  reports  and  statements.  In  the 
last  interview  I  had  with  General  Lee,  since  my  return  to  the 


46 


country,  I  mentioned  to  him  my  estimates  of  his  strength  at 
various  times,  and  he  said  that  they  fully  covered  his  force  at  all 
times,  and  in  some  instances  were  in  excess.  They  are  those  I 
have  now  given  you. 

From  the  facts  I  have  presented,  I  think  you  will  have  no  diffi 
culty  in  discerning  that  the  fall  of  Richmond,  and  the  surrender 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  was  the  consequence  of  events 
in  the  West  and  Southwest,  and  not  directly  of  the  operations  in 
Virginia.  I  say  this,  without  intending  to  cast  any  reproach, 
directly  or  by  implication,  on  the  commanders  or  the  rank  and 
file  of  our  armies  operating  in  those  quarters.  For  them  I  have  a 
profound  respect  and  admiration,  and  I  am  ever  ready  to  receive  and 
acknowledge  them  as  worthy  coadjutors  and  comrades  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia.  They  had,  also,  the  disadvantages  of  over 
whelming  numbers,  and  the  other  agencies  I  have  mentioned,  to 
contend  against,  and  a  truthful  history  of  their  deeds  will  confer 
upon  them  imperishable  renown.  I  do  not  feel  that  it  is  necessary 
or  just  to  attempt  to  build  up  the  reputation  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  or  its  Commander,  at  the  expense  of  our  comrades 
who  battled  so  gloriously  and  vigorously  on  other  fields  for  the  same 
just  and  holy  cause.  What  I  have  said  is  not  mentioned  with  any 
such  purpose,  but  simply  to  note  what  I  conceive  to  be  an  appa 
rent  and  indisputable  historic  fact,  that  ought  not  to  be  overlooked 
in  a  review  of  General  Lee's  military  record. 

At  the  close  of  the  war,  the  deportment  and  conduct  of  our 
noble  and  honored  leader  were  worthy  of  his  previous  history ; 
and  in  that  dignified  and  useful  retirement  to  which  he  devoted 
the  remainder  of  his  days,  in  your  midst,  the  true  grandeur  of  his 
soul  shone  out  as  conspicuously  as  had  his  transcendant  military 
genius  in  his  campaigns,  but  I  leave  the  duty  of  illustrating  that 
to  others. 

There  have  been  efforts  to  draw  parallels  between  our  illustrious 
Chief  and  some  of  the  renowned  commanders  of  former  times,  but 
these  efforts  have  always  proved  unsatisfactory  to  me. 


47 


"Where  shall  we  turn  to  find  the  peer  of  our  great  and  pure  sol 
dier  and  hero?  Certainly,  we  shall  not  find  one  among  the  mythic 
heroes  of  Homer,  the  wrath  of  the  chief  of  whom  was  : 

"To  Greece  the  direful  spring  of  woes  unnumber'd." 

Nor  shall  we  find  one  among  the  Grecian  commanders  of  a  later 
period,  though  in  the  devotion  of  the  hero  of  Thermopylae,  and 
the  daring  of  the  victor  of  Marathon,  may  be  found  similes  for 
the  like  qualities  in  our  hero.  But  there  is  too  much  of  fable  and 
the  license  of  the  heroic  verse,  in  the  narrations  of  their  deeds,  to 
make  them  reliable. 

Shall  we  take  Alexander,  who,  at  the  head  of  his  serried  pha 
lanxes,  encountered  the  effeminate  masses  of  Asia  and  scattered 
them  like  sheep  before  a  ravening  wolf?  While  sighing  for  new 
worlds  to  conquer,  he  could  not  control  himself,  but  fell  a  victim 
to  his  own  excesses. 

In  the  march  of  Hannibal,  the  great  Carthagenian  patriot  and 
hero,  over  the  Alps,  and  his  campaigns  in  Italy,  we  might  find  a 
similarity  to  General  Lee's  bold  strategy,  but  the  system  of  war 
fare  in  those  days,  the  implements  of  war,  and  the  mode  of  main 
taining  armies  in  the  field,  which  had  neither  baggage  nor  supply 
trains,  but  foraged  on  the  country  in  which  they  operated,  make 
such  a  vast  difference  that  the  parallel  ceases  at  the  very  begin 
ning.  Besides,  Carthage  and  Rome  were  then  nearly  equal  in 
power,  and  Hannibal  was  enabled  to  receive  reinforcements  from 
Carthage  by  sea,  as  the  Carthagenians  were  a  great  maritime 
people;  and  the  hostile  neighbors  to  Rome  readily  furnished  him 
with  allies  and  auxiliaries. 

We  will  not  find  in  Republican  Rome  a  parallel.  Certainly  not 
in  Julius  Csesar,  the  greatest  of  Roman  Generals,  who,  at  the  head 
of  the  legions  of  "  the  mistress  of  the  world,"  overran  the  coun 
tries  of  barbarians,  and  then  turned  his  sword  against  the  liberties 
of  his  country. 


48 


We  shall  search  in  vain  for  one  among  the  Generals  of  the 
Empire,  either  before  or  after  its  partition  ;  nor  shall  we  find  one 
among  the  leaders  of  the  barbaric  hordes  which  overran  the  ter 
ritories  of  the  degenerate  Romans ;  nor  in  the  dark  ages ;  nor 
among  the  Crusaders,  who,  under  the  standard  of  the  Cross, 
committed  such  crimes  against  religion  and  humanity ;  nor 
among  the  chieftains  of  the  middle  ages,  to  advance  whose  am 
bitious  projects  the  nations  of  Europe  were,  by  turns,  torn  and 
ravaged. 

Perhaps,  in  the  champion  of  Protestantism,  from  the  North  of 
Europe,  Gustavus  Adolphus,  there  might  be  found  no  unworthy 
parallel  for  our  great  Leader,  as  well  in  regard  to  purity  and  unsel 
fishness  of  character,  as  heroic  courage  and  devotion,  and  the  com 
parison  has  not  inaptly  been  drawn ;  but  the  career  of  the  heroic 
king  of  Sweden  was  cut  short,  by  death  in  battle,  at  so  early  a 
period,  and  before  he  had  stood  the  test  of  adversity,  that  the 
materials  for  completing  the  parallel  are  wanting. 

Some  have  undertaken  to  draw  the  parallel  between  our  pure 
Chieftain  and  Marlborough,  who  owed  his  rise,  in  the  first  place, 
to  the  dishonor  of  his  family  and  the  patronage  of  a  debauched 
Court  favorite.  I  utterly  repudiate  that  comparison.  Besides, 
Marlborough  commanded  the  armies  of  the  greatest  maritime 
power  in  the  world,  in  alliance  with  all  the  rest  of  Europe,  against 
France  alone.  Shall  we  compare  General  Lee  to  the  great  Napo 
leon,  or  his  successful  antagonist,  Wellington  ?  Napoleon  was  a 
captain  of  most  extraordinary  genius,  but  success  was  always  neces 
sary  to  him.  As  long  as  he  had  what  Forest,  with  such  terse 
vigor,  if  inelegance,  would  call  "  the  bulge/7  he  did  wondrously, 
but  he  could  never  stand  reverses ;  and  the  disastrous  retreat  from 
Moscow,  and  the  shameful  flight  from  Waterloo,  must  always  be 
blots  on  his  military  escutcheon.  He  would  have  been  unable  to 
conduct  the  campaigns  of  General  Lee  against  the  constantly  accu 
mulating  and  ever  renewing  armies  of  the  enemy,  and  none  of  his 
own  campaigns  were  at  all  similar  to  them.  He  played  a  bold 


49 


game  for  empire  and  self-aggrandizement,  regardless  of  the  lives, 
liberties  or  happiness  of  others,  and  the  first  adverse  turn  of  the 
wheel  of  fortune  ruined  him.  The  hundred  days  constituted  but 
the  last  desperate  effort  of  a  ruined  gambler. 

Wellington  was  a  prudent,  good  soldier,  at  the  head  of  the 
armies  of  a  most  powerful  nation,  "  the  mistress  of  the  seas,"  in 
alliance  with  all  Europe  against  Napoleon  in  his  waning  days. 
He  was  emphatically  a  favorite  child  of  fortune,  and  won  his 
chief  glory  in  a  game  against  the  desperate  gambler  whose  last 
stake  was  up,  when  he  had  all  the  odds  on  his  side.  "  The  Iron 
Duke/'  though  almost  worshipped  and  overwhelmed  with  honors 
and  riches  by  the  British  nation,  does  not  furnish  a  suitable 
parallel  for  the  great  Confederate  Commander. 

In  regard  to  all  I  have  mentioned,  and  all  other  renowned 
military  chieftains  of  other  days,  in  the  old  world,  it  must  be 
recollected  that  they  did  not  have  to  contend  against  the  new 
elements  in  the  art  of  war,  which  were  brought  to  bear  against 
our  armies  and  their  commanders. 

Coming  now  to  this  side  of  the  water,  we  may  draw  a  parallel 
between  General  Lee  and  our  great  Washington  in  many  respects; 
for  in  their  great  self-command,  in  their  patriotism,  and  in  their 
purity  and  unselfishness  of  character,  there  was  a  great  similarity ; 
but  the  military  operations  of  General  Lee  were  on  so  much 
grander  a  scale  than  those  of  Washington,  and  the  physical 
changes  in  the  character  of  the  country,  wrought  by  the  adap 
tation  of  steam-power,  the  invention  of  railroads  and  the  telegraph, 
were  so  great,  that  there  ceases  to  be  any  further  points  of  com 
parison  between  them  as  soldiers.  It  was  the  physical  difficulty 
of  penetrating  the  country,  backed  by  the  material  aid,  in  men, 
money  and  ships  of  war,  of  a  powerful  European  nation,  which 
enabled  tfye  States  to  win  their  independence  under  Washington ; 
while  the  facilities  for  rapid  communication  and  concentration,  in 
connection  with  the  aid  received  by  our  enemies,  in  men  and 
money,  from  all  Europe,  which  was  a  recruiting  ground  for  them 
4 


50 


caused  our  disasters  and  lost  us  our  liberties,  in  a  contest  in 
which  we  stood  alone. 

There  is  no  occasion  to  draw  a  parallel  between  General  Lee 
and  our  dead  heroes,  Sidney  Johnston  and  Jackson.  The  career 
of  the  former,  whose  dawn  gave  such  bright  promise,  was  unfor 
tunately,  cut  off  so  soon  that  the  country  at  large  did  not  have  an 
opportunity  of  learning  all  of  which  those  who  knew  him  believed 
him  to  be  capable. 

Whoever  shall  undertake  to  draw  a  parallel  between  General 
Lee  and  his  great  Lieutenant,  for  the  purpose  of  depreciating  the 
one  or  the  other,  cannot  have  formed  the  remotest  conception  of 
the  true  character  of  either  of  those  illustrious  men,  and  congenial 
Christian  heroes.  Let  us  be  thankful  that  our  cause  had  two  such 
champions,  and  that,  in  their  characters,  we  can  furnish  the  world 
at  large  with  the  best  assurance  of  the  rightfulness  of  the  prin 
ciples  for  which  they  and  we  fought.  When  asked  for  our  vindica 
tion,  we  can  triumphantly  point  to  the  graves  of  Lee  and  Jackson 
and  look  the  world  squarely  in  the  face.  Let  them,  the  descendant 
of  the  Cavalier  from  tide-water,  and  the  scion  of  the  Scotch-Irish 
stock  from  the  mountains  of  Northwestern  Virginia,  lie  here,  in 
this  middle  ground,  and  let  their  memories  be  cherished  and 
mingled  together  in  that  harmony  which  characterized  them  dur 
ing  their  glorious  companionship  in  arms. 

Nor  would  it  be  at  all  profitable  to  institute  a  comparison  be 
tween  General  Lee  and  any  of  our  living  commanders.  Let  us 
be  rejoiced  that  those  still  survive  who  were  worthy  defenders  of 
our  cause,  and  not  unfit  comrades  of  Lee,  Sidney  Johnston  and 
Stonewall  Jackson. 

Shall  I  compare  General  Lee  to  his  successful  antagonist?  As 
well  compare  the  great  pyramid  which  rears  its  majestic  propor 
tions  in  the  valley  of  the  Nile,  to  a  pigmy  perched  on  ft^ount  Atlas. 

No,  my  friends,  it  is  a  vain  work  for  us  to  seek  anywhere  for  a 
parallel  to  the  great  character  which  has  won  our  admiration  and 


51 


love.  Our  beloved  Chief  stands,  like  some  lofty  column  which 
rears  its  head  among  the  highest,  in  grandeur,  simple,  pure  and 
sublime,  needing  no  borrowed  lustre;  and  he  is  all  our  own. 

And  now,  my  friends,  I  must  add  that  we  are  often  invoked  to 
turn  our  backs  upon  the  dead  past,  to  forget  dead  issues  and  prin 
ciples — as  if  true  principles  ever  die — to  surrender  our  cherished 
traditions,  to  give  up  our  civilization,  and  adopt  the  progressive 
civilization  of  the  age.  We  are  also  told  that  our  ideas  are  all 
obsolete,  and  asked  to  adopt  the  spirit  of  progress  from  our  ene 
mies,  in  order  to  restore  the  prosperity  of  our  country  and  start 
it  on  a  new  career  of  material  development  and  physical  power. 
There  are  many  who  are  seduced  by  the  flattering  visions  pic 
tured  to  them,  and  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  there  exists  a 
feverish  desire  to  emerge  from  our  depressed  condition  into  sud 
den  wealth  and  prosperity  by  the  adoption  of  various  fanciful 
schemes. 

This  spirit  bodes  no  good  to  our  people  or  our  country.  The 
fortunes  of  no  country  can  be  retrieved  from  such  a  depression, 
as  ours  have  experienced,  by  any  sudden  or  hot  house  process,  and 
all  these  ideas  of  doing  it  by  foreign  capital  or  immigrants,  are 
deceptive.  Those  of  us  who  deprecate  the  new  theories,  are  said 
to  be  behind  the  age,  and  called  fossils,  fogies  and  Bourbons,  who 
brood  over  and  live  in  the  past,  while  we  take  no  thought  for  the 
future.  They  very  much  mistake  us  who  think  that,  while  we  do 
venerate  the  past,  we  are  not  willing  to  unite  in  all  proper  mea 
sures  for  restoring  a  sound  and  wholesome  prosperity  to  our  be 
loved  country.  We  do  not,  however,  think  it  proper  to  run  the 
ploughshare  over  the  graves  of  our  fathers,  in  order  to  conform  to 
the  utilitarian  spirit  of  this  age ;  and  we  do  believe  that  a  people 
who  forget  or  discard  their  traditions,  are  unworthy  and  unfit  to 
be  free.  We  do  not  like  the  progressive  spirit  of  this  age,  because 
we  are  not  certain  from  whence  it  comes,  nor  whither  it  tends. 
We  cannot  turn  our  backs  on  the  graves  of  our  fallen  heroes,  and 


we  will  cherish  the  remembrance  of  their  deeds,  and  see  that  jus 
tice  is  done  to  their  memories,  believing  that  when  "recording 
history," 

"  Tells  of  a  few  stout  hearts,  that  fought  and  died, 
Where  duty  placed  them  at  their  country's  side  ; 
The  man  that  is  not  moved  with  what  he  reads, 
That  takes  not  fire  at  their  heroic  deeds, 
Unworthy  of  the  "blessings  of  the  brave, 
Is  base  in  kind  and  born  to  be  a  slave." 

To  you,  Virginians,  I  must  say,  that  our  ancestors  won  this 
country  from  savage  life,  and  started  Virginia  on  that  career 
which  rendered  her  so  prosperous,  happy  and  renowned.  That 
prosperity  has  not  been  lost  by  any  fault  of  ours,  but  has  been 
torn  from  us  by  violence  and  wrong;  and,  certainly,  in  our 
hands,  the  glory  of  the  State  has  suffered  no  diminution.  Have 
Virginians  degenerated  so  much,  that  they  cannot  undertake  to 
restore  the  prosperity  and  happiness  of  their  State,  without  re 
sorting  to  the  maxims  and  policy  of  those  who  have  ravaged  and 
desolated  their  homes,  and  left  their  old  mother  panting  and 
bleeding?  Can  we  not  point  to  the  graves  of  Lee  and  Jackson, 
and  those  who  fell  fighting  under  them,  and  exclaim : 

"  And  is  thy  grandeur  done? 

Mother  of  men  like  these  ! 

Has  not  thy  outcry  gone 

Where  justice  has  an  ear  to  hear  ? 

EC  holy !     God  shall  guide  thy  spear. " 

In  you,  my  fair  countrywomen,  I  have  faith.  I  know  that  you 
will  continue  to  honor  the  brave  dead,  and  strew  flowers  on  their 
graves.  Your  sex,  in  all  the  South,  may  be  relied  on  to  instil  the 


53 


sentiments  of  honor  and  patriotism  into  the  hearts  of  the  rising 
and  future  generations,  and  teach  them  to  venerate  the  memory, 
emulate  the  virtues  and  cherish  the  principles  of  those  who  fell 
fighting  for  your  homes,  your  all. 

In  you  and  your  compeers,  my  young  friends,  from  all  the 
South,  must  mainly  rest  the  hope  of  our  country,  for  restoration 
to  prosperity  and  happiness.  You  are  fortunate  in  having  the 
opportunity  of  being  prepared  for  your  future  career,  here,  where 
lie  the  remains  of  two  such  men  as  Lee  and  Jackson,  and  where 
you  can  catch  inspiration  from  the  hallowed  precincts.  Profit  by 
the  occasion  and  go  forth  into  the  world,  with  the  determination 
of  following  their  example  and  battling  for  the  right,  leaving  the 
consequences  to  your  Maker. 

And  to  you,  my  comrades,  survivors  of  that  noble  army  of 
which  I  have  spoken,  followers  of  Lee  and  Jackson,  I  desire  to 
say  a  few  parting  words.  I  trust  it  is  not  necessary  for  me  to 
urge  you  to  remain  true  to  the  memory  of  your  venerated  leaders, 
and  the  principles  for  which  you  fought  along  with  them.  If 
there  be  any,  in  all  the  land,  who  have  proved  renegade  to  their 
comrades  and  our  holy  cause,  let  them  go  out  from  among  us 
with  the  brand  of  Cain  upon  them  !  But  while  cherishing  the 
memory  of  our  leaders  and  our  fallen  comrades,  as  a  sacred 
trust,  it  is  not  proper  that  we  should  indulge  in  vain  regrets 
or  cease  the  battle  of  life.  Let  the  holy  memories  connected 
with  our  glorious  though  unsuccessful  struggle,  afford  stronger 
incentives  to  renewed  efforts  to  do  our  duty;  but  let  us  discard 
all  deceptive  illusions,  and  rely  upon  our  own  energies  and  the 
manhood  that,  I  trust,  did  not  make  us  unworthy  comrades  of 
the  illustrious  dead.  We  have  a  mission  to  perform  and  we 
must  not  prove  recreant  to  it. 

We  have  also  a  sacred  duty  to  discharge.  It  is  meet  and  proper 
that  the  tomb  of  our  beloved  Commander,  in  this  chapel,  shall  be 
suitably  decorated  and  honored.  Let  it  be  our  especial  charge  to 


54 


see  that  the  pious  work  is  accomplished ;  and  let  us  also  see  that 
a  monument  to  his  glorious  memory  is  erected  at  the  Confederate 
Capital,  in  defence  of  which  his  wondrous  talents  and  sublime 
virtues  were  displayed,  which  shall  proclaim  to  all  the  ages,  that 
the  soldiers  who  fought  under  him  remained  true  to  him  in  death, 
and  were  not  unworthy  to  have  been  the  followers  of  ROBERT 
E.  LEE. 


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